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The continual increase in electricity dependence for the advancement of society has led to increased 
demand in electricity globally. This increased demand, among other things such as global warming 
interventions and energy security have encouraged the need to diversify electricity generation 
sources. Civilian use of nuclear power dates back to the 1950s.  The United States of America and 
France are currently leading with the highest nuclear power generation in the world, generating 101 
GWe and 63 GWe, respectively. Several countries such as China and the United Arab Emirates have 
committed to new nuclear build in order to increase their nuclear power generation capacities. 
Standing against the prospects of growth of the nuclear power industry are technical and non-
technical challenges. These include proliferation risk, safety, high capital costs and high-level waste 
management. Most spent nuclear fuel from power reactors is currently stored in the spent fuel 
pools on reactor sites, and some have been reprocessed. It is estimated that about 32% (370 000 
tons of Heavy Metal) of the total spent fuel generated from power reactors have been reprocessed 
up to date. With most of the spent fuel pools filling up, alternative interim and long term disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel solutions have been under investigation from as early as the 1970s. South Africa 
has planned an interim dry storage facility for the spent nuclear fuel to be established at the existing 
Koeberg power station. The interim dry storage facility will make use of HI-STAR 100 multi-purpose 
casks to store spent nuclear fuel until the country decides on final disposal solution. There are many 
aspects that are critical to safe, efficient and cost-effective long term storage of spent nuclear fuel.  
Some of the physics and engineering aspects concerning dry storage facilities are briefly discussed. 
The aspects presented here are: radiation containment, spent fuel, sub-criticality, decay heat 
removal, site location aspects, response to seismic events, cask corrosion, transportation 
infrastructure, operability and monitoring. The study of the three existing dry cask storages from the 
USA, Hungary and Belgium gives an overview of the dry cask technology in use today. These 
presentations are based on publicly available reliable information.  
The proposed dry storage facility at Koeberg will be in the existing power station footprint using the 
HI-STAR 100 casks. The decision to have the proposed dry storage facility at Koeberg will minimise 
related licence applications and part of security installations as the site already has some security. 
The location of the facility in the power station’s footprint also allows for cost-effective and safe 
transportation of casks from the reactor building to the proposed facility.  The modularity aspect of 
the dry cask storage facility at MV Paks in Hungary should also be employed at Koeberg to allow for 
more storage. This will cater for additional casks that may need to be stored if more nuclear power 
plants are procured in the future. South Africa’s air traffic around the Western Cape is not as 
congested as Belgium’s. There is, therefore, no need for the casks to be housed in concrete buildings 
like Doel’s. Most of Koeberg’s high-level waste would have had a longer cooling time in the pools 
compared to the minimum cooling time required for the chosen cask technology. This will provide a 
conservative, safe approach for Koeberg’s facility. Dry cask storage technology has provided a 
reliable interim dry storage solution for several countries. Despite uncertainties for long term 
disposal options, the proposed dry cask storage facility at Koeberg is a suitable interim storage 
alternative for South Africa to allow continuous operation of the plant. This conclusion is based on 
the physics and engineering aspects that have been presented in this minor dissertation.  
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1. Overview of nuclear energy and current contribution to electricity 
generation  
Since its discovery in the 18th century, electricity has become one of the vital components for 
societal development all over the world. This continuous dependence on electrical energy for 
development has led to an increase in demand for power generation capacity throughout the world. 
In an attempt to meet the growing demand, diversify generation technologies and increase security 
of supply, several generation technologies are in operation today, including nuclear power. Civil use 
of nuclear power dates back to the 1950s, where it was initially used for electricity generation in 
1950 [1] [2].  
Nuclear power currently accounts for about 11% of the world’s electricity base-load supply. It is the 
second largest source of low-carbon electricity generation after hydropower [3] [4] [5]. The United 
States of America (USA) and France are currently leading in the nuclear power industry, with the 
largest nuclear power generation capacities, generating 101 GWe and 63 GWe, respectively. 
Although the USA generates 101 GWe of nuclear power, it only accounts for about 19% of the total 
domestic electricity generated [6]. France’s nuclear generation accounts for about 76% of the total 
domestic electricity generated [7] [8].  There are currently 31 countries worldwide that have over 
440 nuclear reactors generating electricity, with a number of countries planning to expand their 
nuclear power generation capacities in the coming years. The nuclear power industry is dominated 
by pressurised water and boiling water reactor technologies (PWR and BWR) [9]. PWR and BWR 
technologies generate about 87% of nuclear power worldwide [10] [11].  
China’s current nuclear electricity contributes about 3% of the total installed generation in the 
country. This is generated using 37 reactors of different technologies with an installed capacity of 34 
GWe as of 2017. There are 20 reactors under construction, a plan to increase the nuclear generation 
to 58 GWe by 2020 and construction of nuclear plants from 2020 which will add 30 GWe. The United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) is also embarking on a nuclear power program. The construction of four APR-
1400 reactors commenced in 2012. These will give a gross output of 5.6 GWe in addition to the 
current 19 GWe total electricity output. France’s energy policy makes provision for reduction of 
nuclear power generation to 50% from its current 76% [12] [13] [14] [15].     
1.2. South Africa’s electrical infrastructure  
South Africa’s only nuclear power plant, Koeberg,  contributes about 5% of the 45 GWe of the total 
installed electricity generation in the country [16] [17]. The plant has been in operation since 1984 
and has two pressurised water reactors (PWR) each with an installed capacity of 960 MW of 
electrical power. Over 90% of the electricity in South Africa is currently generated using coal with 
most of the power plants located in the northern part of the country [17] [18]. The abundance of 
coal in the northern part of the country has led to the concentration of these coal-fired power 
stations in Mpumalanga, Gauteng and Limpopo provinces. South Africa experienced power 
shortages around 2008 due to lack of generating capacity. The country’s initial Integrated Resource 




was accepted by the cabinet [19]. However, the draft IRP 2016 which was at public consultation 
stage at the time of this dissertation has projected a delay in construction, with the first contribution 
of 1359 MW only expected in 2037 [20]. The total projected contribution of nuclear power by 2050 
is 20385 MW [20].  This is very likely to change as it depends on the IRP, which gets updated every 
two years and in turn, depends on economic growth among other factors.  
1.3. Some of the challenges of nuclear power 
Public acceptance of nuclear power has been an issue in many countries due to the introduction of 
nuclear fission in the early 1940s during the Second World War and nuclear accidents that have 
followed after. The most historic nuclear accidents are the 1979 Three Mile Island accident, the 1986 
Chernobyl and the 2011 Fukushima accident in Japan. Countries such as Germany decided to phase 
out nuclear power generation after the 2011 Fukushima accident while other countries like China 
decided to increase their nuclear power generation capacity despite the unfortunate accidents. Fear 
of the possibility of nuclear proliferation from nuclear power plants still creeps in many people’s 
hearts today regardless of the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons signed in 1968 by 
major countries.  
Possibilities of terrorist attacks that can access nuclear waste also contribute to public opposition to 
nuclear power. Samia Rashad [21]and the interdisciplinary MIT study [22] highlight some key issues 
that the nuclear industry needs to address in detail for future expansion of nuclear energy. Waste 
management is one of the critical aspects highlighted in these two studies.  South Africa is not 
immune to public opposition of nuclear power. This was experienced during the construction of 
Koeberg power station and demonstrations that have been shown in response to Thyspunt site in 
the Eastern Cape being chosen for a nuclear power station [23]. In addition to nuclear accidents and 
high capital costs associated with the nuclear build, communities are often worried about nuclear 
waste.  
1.3.1. Classification of radioactive waste from nuclear power 
The World Nuclear Association classifies nuclear waste into four categories, namely exempt and very 
low-level waste, low-level waste, intermediate-level waste and high-level waste.  The classification 
of these wastes is based on the heat generated and level of radioactivity and determines how the 
waste is handled. Other classification systems use the radioactivity and the half-life of the 
radionuclide to classify waste [24]. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) classifies waste 
into six categories, namely exempt waste, very short-lived waste, very low-level waste, low-level 
waste, intermediate waste and high-level waste [25]. Classification of waste also differs from country 
to country [26]. 
 The difference in waste classification systems from country to country arise because of different 
purposes which classification systems aim to address. Some of the classification systems have been 
placed to simplify the language and assist in planning while on the other hand, regulatory bodies 
have classification systems to ensure safety. Even though there is a variation in classification 
systems, the origin of the waste or contents of the waste is generally used as the basis for these 
classifications. Other classification of waste uses physical properties such as the phase of the waste 




1.3.2. Nuclear fuel cycle  
There are two nuclear fuel cycles for nuclear power in use and under research today. These fuel 
cycles describe steps from the mining of the uranium through its utilisation as fuel in the reactor up 
to waste disposal [28]. Nuclear fuel cycles are generally classified into three distinct phases, the 
front-end, reactor and back-end [29]. The front-end activities are associated with the preparation 
and delivering of the fuel for the reactor. This activity ranges from uranium mining to completion of 
fuel assemblies. The fuel assemblies must be specific for the reactor type. The reactor extracts 
energy from the fuel. The back-end activity involves the management of spent fuel from the reactor 
and safe disposal of all different wastes generated [29] [30]. Below is a diagram adapted from [28], 
showing steps in a fuel cycle for a typical 1000 MWe reactor.  
 
Figure 1-1: Typical nuclear fuel cycle [28]  
The enriched uranium-235 is the most common in use today. This uses an enriched (typically ranging 
from 3-5%) uranium as the initial fuel [31]. Other fuels in use include natural uranium currently in 
the CANDU technology which has no enrichment. The MOX cycle is another cycle where the 
plutonium which has been recovered during the reprocessing is mixed with new or used uranium to 
form a mixed uranium and plutonium oxide fuel [31]. Other fuels that are not discussed in detail 
here include, thorium and DUPIC [32] [33]. The fuel cycle is either an open or closed cycle. This 
division of the cycles is necessary due to the possibility of reprocessing at the back end of the cycle. 
An open fuel cycle is one where the fuel is used in the reactor only once and sent for disposal or 
interim storage after irradiation in the reactor. A closed cycle is one where the spent fuel is 
reprocessed to extract uranium after sufficient cooling in the spent fuel pool.  In Figure 1-1 above, 




2. Literature review: Current spent fuel management  
2.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter gives an overview of current spent fuel management in practice today. At the centre of 
deciding the spent fuel management option is the understanding of the spent fuel itself. A brief 
overview of a typical spent fuel design is discussed. The spent fuel management options that are 
discussed here are the spent fuel pool, dry cask storage, reprocessing and deep geological 
repository.  
2.2. Spent fuel overview  
2.2.1. Overview of a typical fuel design  
The majority of nuclear power plants use fuel that has uranium dioxide pellets which are placed in a 
sealed tube of zirconium alloy. A typical pellet is cylindrical and about 9 mm in diameter [32]. There 
is a gap of about 1 mm between the cladding and the fuel pellet to allow the fuel to swell as it heats 
up inside the reactor without causing damages to the structural integrity of the cladding. The gap 
also allows for ease of pellet insertion during the manufacturing process and provides space for 
helium gas to keep a predetermined pressure. A typical PWR cladding thickness is about a 
millimetre, thereby making the fuel rod (fuel pellet, gap and cladding) to range between 9 and 14 
mm in diameter, depending on the reactor design.  
The fuel rod acts as the primary confinement of the fuel in the reactor. Zirconium alloy is used for 
cladding in all reactor technologies in use today. There are slight variations in the mixture of the 
elements for cladding; an example is a Magnox reactor which uses Magnox alloy for cladding. 
Magnox alloy is magnesium with approximately 1% of zirconium or aluminium [33]. Some of the 
essential factors in determining the material for cladding include heat transfer capability, low 
neutron absorption, especially for thermal neutrons for PWR, mechanical strength and high 
corrosion resistance [34].  
The rod is not filled to capacity to allow space for the release of gases during fission. A number of 
fuel rods arranged in a specific geometry make up a fuel assembly together with control rods used to 
control the fission [32] [34]. A fuel assembly typically consists of fuel rods ranging from 14x14 to 
17x17 [34]. The geometry of the fuel assemblies also differs from reactor to reactor. There are 3 
common geometries in use today. These are hexagonal, circular and square arrangements. Table 2-1 
shows some of the parameters of fuel assemblies for different reactors and a diagram of a 17x17 
fuel assembly with rod control, adapted from [35], is shown in Figure 2-1. The common reactors 
presented in Table 2-1 are the Russian VVER-1000, PWR from Westinghouse and EDF and a typical 
BWR. The VVER is a Russian acronym for “vodo-vodyanoi energetichesky reacktor” which translates 
to water-water energetic reactor in English. The concept behind this name is that the reactor uses 
water for both cooling and moderation. EDF is an acronym for French’s Électricité de France, a 
nuclear electric power company.  The BWR is an acronym for boiling water reactor which does not 






Table 2-1: Some of the typical parameters of the fuel design of common reactors 





















VVER – 1000 1000 Hexagonal  7.6 E110, 
E635 
 66 300  
PWR 
(Westinghouse) 
1100 Square  7.8  Zircaloy-
4 
17 x 17  193 264 
PWR (EDF) 900 Square  8.2  Zircaloy  17 x 17  157 264 
BWR  1000 Square  9.55 Zircaloy-
2 










2.2.2. Spent fuel characteristics overview  
 
A typical PWR like Koeberg’s removes and refuels a third of its fuel every 18 months. This means that 
in a case of an EDF reactor as above in Table 2-1, a third of 157 fuel assemblies will be replaced, i.e. 
52 fuel assemblies. The spent fuel will then be transferred to a spent fuel pool for temporary storage 
for a prescribed minimum number of years depending on the country/reactor technology (at least 
ten years in almost all reactors [36]). The nuclear composition of spent fuel depends on the specific 
fuel used (which is determined by reactor type), enrichment, neutron energy spectrum and the fuel 
burnup [37] [38]. Fuel burnup refers to the amount of thermal energy extracted from fission per unit 
mass of fuel [39]. Fuel burnup is measured in megawatt-days per tonne (MWd/t) or gigawatt-days 
per tonne of heavy metal (GWd/tHM).  
Most reactors manufactured in the 1970s have a burnup of between 30 and 33 GWd/tHM. Reactors 
that followed have a burnup of up to 50 GWd/tHM and possible future burnup currently under 
research will go up to 150 GWd/tHM [40]. Feiveson et al. [38] claim that the higher the burnup, the 
smaller the spent fuel discharged from the reactor. Xu et al. [40] also agree that higher burnup 
reduces the volume and mass of spent fuel per unit mass of electricity generated. However, the 
storage and disposal volume savings remain uncertain due to higher decay heat. Some of the focus 
areas of improvement for future nuclear reactors include minimising waste. The relationship 
between burnup and waste reduction has become a pivotal one for future nuclear reactors. 
Below is a table adapted from [38] which shows a typical annual discharge of spent fuel for different 
reactor technologies. The assumptions made in the below table are:   
(i). Reactor with an output of 1GW electrical power 
(ii). Reactor with a 90% capacity factor  
Table 2-2: Typical annual discharge of spent fuel per reactor technology 
Reactor  Typical burnup (GWd/tHM) Annual discharge of spent fuel 
(tons)  
 
PWR  50 20 
CANDU 7 140 
RBMK  15 65 
 
This minor dissertation only focuses on uranium thermal fuelled-reactors. Such reactors have fuel 
composed of a mixture of isotopes of uranium. The uranium isotopes present in the reactor fuel is 
Uranium-234, Uranium-235 and Uranium-238. Natural uranium has 0.72% of the fissile Uranium-235 
and typical enrichment will increase it to between 3.5 to 4.5%. Higher burnups require higher 
enrichment.  
The spent fuel from a reactor has three categories of radionuclides, namely the actinides, fission 
products and activation products. This is high-level waste that needs to be treated with the utmost 
care. Ewing [37] claims that the spent fuel radioactivity at its initial removal from the reactor is a 
hundred thousand more compared to unused fuel. The approximated radioactivity is about 




nuclear waste in a power station but cannot be assembled in small sizes due to heat generation and 
the level of radioactivity [41].  The fission products constitute about 3-4% of the spent nuclear fuel 
with a typical mass distribution shown below in Figure 2-2, adapted from [42]. Some of the typical 
fission products of a PWR include Strontium-90, Iodine-131 and Cesium-137. The half-lives of the 
fission products vary from a couple of months to a million years. These (fission products) are formed 
by the disintegration of the fissile material (uranium and plutonium) in the reactor core.  
Fission products are radioactive because the ratio of the neutrons to protons is large; this is 
inherited from the fissile isotopes which undergo fission.  In general, the fission products have short 
half-lives relative to actinides. This short half-life is of the order of tens of years. Most of the fission 
products also have short decay chains and generally determine the short-term behaviour of the 
spent fuel  
From many fission products generated in the reactor, there are few that are of main concern due to 
their longer half-lives. The fission products can generally be classified into 3 groups according to 
their half-lives. These are short-lived, medium-lived and long-lived fission products. The half-lives for 
these categories are less than 5 years, between 5 and 100 years and 100 years and more, 
respectively. Hundreds of fission products are short-lived, i.e. less than a year and ultimately would 
have disappeared entirely in 100 years. Example of short-lived fission products would include Xenon-
135 (half-life of 9.2 hours) and Iodine-131 (half-life of 8 days). The short-lived fission products would 
not be much of a concern due to their short half-life which would make them to have decreased by a 
factor of million after 100 years   
In the medium-lived category, examples include Strontium-90 and Cesium-137, which have half-lives 
of about 28 and 30 years, respectively. Some of the fission products with half-lives longer than 100 
years are Iodine-129 (15.7 million years), Cesium-135 (2.3 million years) and Zirconium-93 (1.61 
million years) [43]. Therefore, the long-term activity of nuclear waste due to fission products comes 
from fission products such as Iodine-129, Strontium-90 and Cesium-137. Iodine-129 decays to 
Xenon-129 through gamma and beta emissions.  Strontium-90 decays to Yttrium-90 with a half-life 





Figure 2-2: Fission products mass distribution [42] 
 
Figure 2-3: Relative radiotoxicity on inhalation of spent nuclear fuel [82] 
 The actinides are formed when neutrons are captured by the uranium and plutonium isotopes 
without fission [41] [44]. Actinides are also called transuranic elements. They contribute to heat 
generation of the spent fuel considerably due to their high activity. Actinides and their daughter 




from Figure 2-3. Many actinides have longer half-lives in contrast to fission products, of the order of 
thousands of years. Examples include Plutonium-239 (half-life of about 24000 years, Americium-241 
(half-life of about 432 years), Plutonium-240 (half-life of about 6561 years), Plutonium-242 (half-life 
of 375 000 years) and Neptunium-237 (half-life of about 2.1 million years). They govern the long 
term behaviour of the spent fuel characteristics.  
Activation products are produced from irradiation of materials located in the high radiation level 
parts of the reactor core [44]. They are generally ignored due to their small contribution to decay 
heat and radioactivity when compared with fission products and actinides. Examples of activation 
products include Argon-41, Cobalt-60 and Technetium-99.  
Graves et al. [45] highlight that the main radiation concern from a spent fuel pool is Cesium-137 due 
to its relatively long half-life of about 30 years,   presence in high volume in the spent fuel, its far-
reaching absorption into the human body and transportability in gaseous plumes. Spent fuel tends 
to be more “rich” in Cesium-137 than in the reactor core. A fission product such as Iodine-131 has a 
half-life of about 8 days, but its effect of causing thyroid cancer, especially in children, can be 
mitigated by taking potassium iodide pills [45]. The radioactivity of the fission products and actinides 
as a function of time after discharge from the reactor is shown in Figure 2-4 below, adapted from 
[34]. The radioactivity is given in curies per tonne of heavy metal (Ci/tonne HM).  A curie is equal to 
3.7 × 1010 Becquerel (Bq). These have been computed using computer programs.  
  
(a)         (b) 
 
Figure 2-4: Radioactivity of some of the waste radionuclides as a function of time: (a) a reactor with 
33 GWd/tHM and (b) a reactor with 50 GWd/tHM [34] 
 
The radioactivity of the spent fuel is dominated by the fission products up to 1000 years after 




range of 2.85 × 1015𝐵𝑞 and 3.7 × 1015 𝐵𝑞, respectively. These values differ with the initial fuel 
enrichment and burnup. The understanding of the long-term physical, chemical and thermal 
behaviour of the spent fuel is critical for safe spent fuel management. This calls for continuous 
monitoring and analysis of the spent fuel.     
2.3. Spent fuel pool  
 
The amount of decay heat produced by high-level waste and the radioactivity makes it require 
cooling and shielding. Between 6 and 7% of the heat generated during the normal reactor operation 
is initially generated by the decay of spent fuel [42].  High-level waste is regarded as one of the 
major issues arising from the use of nuclear power reactors by various organisations such as the 
World Nuclear Association and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission [46] [47].   
The spent fuel pool (SFP) has three main general objectives, namely to cool the spent fuel and 
thereby prevent heat-up from radioactive decay, to prevent criticality accidents from spent fuel and 
shield the workers and the environment from radiation [48]. The SFP is also used to store fresh fuel 
which must be separated from the spent fuel by a sufficient distance to prevent criticality accidents.  
It is therefore essential for the SFP system to continually purify, filter and maintain the required 
water inventory in all different components of the SFP. In most designs, spent fuel pool is a collective 
term that refers to different systems used to cool the spent fuel. These systems include the spent 
fuel pool, spent fuel cask compartment and the transfer compartment in a typical Westinghouse 
design [49] and generation II of the French PWR design. The (European Pressurized Reactor) EPR has 
six subsystems (functional areas) making up a spent fuel pool; incoming cask transport, cask 
reception and preparation, fuel removal, rack movements and long term storage [50].   
 Spent fuel pools are either placed inside the reactor building or the building adjacent to it.  Although 
a third of the fuel is replaced during a fuel cycle, all the fuel assemblies are normally removed to 
enable reactor vessel maintenance and inspection [48]. This makes the SFP experience the highest 
heat generation just after all the fuel assemblies have been offloaded. The removal of the fuel 
assemblies from the reactor vessel is done with the whole space above the reactor vessel immersed 
in borated water [51]. This removal and movement of fuel assemblies under water require that the 
water in the SFP is always as optically clear as possible.   
The design of spent fuel pool differs from reactor to reactor and sometimes from technology to 
technology and from site to site [52]. Most current SFPs can be classified into two types: at-reactor 
(AR) and AFR (away-from-reactor) SFPs. The AR SFPs pools are used for temporary fuel storage while 
the AFR SFs are used for interim storage of spent fuel prior to reprocessing or waiting for final 
disposal [52]. The major general differences between the two pools are: 
 The spent fuel in the at-reactor is characterised by higher decay power than in the away-
reactor pools 
 ARs are generally closer to the reactor vessels and are smaller in size 
The pools are monolithic structures made of reinforced concrete and stainless steel liners to prevent 




borated water for the cooling while others such as BWRs use demineralised water. The depth of SFPs 
varies but typically is about 12 metres. A wide variety exists in terms of width and length with most 
typically between 6 and 12 metres in length and 9 to 18 metres in width [53]. Most of the SFPs have 
minimum water coverage of 3 meters [52] [53]. In Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-6 generic SFP designs for a 
PWR and a BWR adapted from [52] and [54] are shown. 
 






Figure 2-6: Typical SFP design for a BWR [38]  
The SFPs are also used to store other components and in-reactor equipment such as control rods, 
primary neutron source, etc. The irradiated spent fuel is removed from the reactor core and placed 
in spent fuel racks and gets transferred to the pool. The design of these racks is crucial in preventing 
criticality accidents in the SFPs. A variety of designs are in use today. Figure 2-7 below shows some 





Figure 2-7: Spent fuel rack designs for PWRs [52] 
Borated water is used for criticality control in a PWR. This is in addition to sufficient space allocation 
between the fuel assemblies. The design of the spent fuel racks must ensure the sub-criticality of the 
spent fuel in the pools. Most nuclear companies in the United States have been expanding their 
storage capacities by re-racking their spent nuclear fuel pools. This is achieved by decreasing the 
distances between the fuel assemblies [55]. The SFPs generally have dedicated cooling systems, as 
shown in Figure 2-5 above. Coolant is pumped through heat exchangers, and heat is rejected into a 
heat sink of the nuclear power plant. It is clear that the SFPs must be designed to have a lifespan 
many years more than the reactor. This is to cater for the interim storage of the last fuel to be 
withdrawn from the reactor before decommissioning of the nuclear power plant. The EPR reactor 
has a lifespan of 60 years, and its pool is designed with a lifespan of 100 years [50].  
Although there has never been a serious spent fuel pool accident (where there was a total loss of 
coolant, and the accident originated purely from the SFP) in the past, possibilities of losing the SFP 
cooling circulation exist, and the consequences can be hazardous. If the SFP cooling were to be lost, 
the decay heat would boil and evaporate the water thereby compromising its shielding and cooling 
properties. This would then lead to the release of radioactive nuclides inside the SFP room and the 
environment. When the fuel reaches certain temperatures, hydrogen production will start because 
of interaction with the Zircaloy cladding and the water. The governing equation of this interaction is 
given by: 
 𝑍𝑟 + 2𝐻2𝑂 → 𝑍𝑟𝑂2 + 2𝐻2 + ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡 [56].  
This can lead to a hydrogen explosion. Some reports suggest that this is what happened at 
Fukushima in the reactor core due to the absence of cooling while some suggest that hydrogen was 




Causes of cooling loss can range from the malfunction of the cooling system to the loss of water 
inventory in the pools [57]. The design of the SFPs must, therefore, take into account scenarios 
where one or both of the above occurs. In contrast to reactor LOCA (loss of coolant accident), the 
SFP LOCA would be slow due to a large amount of water present in the SFP and low heat generation. 
However, the SFP only has one physical fuel barrier which is the cladding [52]. The worst case 
scenario should look at a loss of cooling that occurs when the decay heat is at its maximum, i.e. 
immediately after fuel off-loading.  
Nimander [57] considers passive systems that prolong boiling of the cooling water and one that 
ensures that boiling never occurs. He concluded that a passive safety system is not possible to 
mitigate the consequences of worst case scenarios using gases at atmospheric pressure. Although 
other designs may exist of passive cooling, he concludes that large enough spent fuel pools are the 
simple and efficient way of prolonging the boiling of cooling waters.  It should be noted that this 
conclusion was based on a PWR reactor and may not necessarily apply to all PWRs. With the 
increase in spent fuel in nuclear power plant sites, the possibilities and economics of having large 
pools may not be feasible.  
Ye et al. [59] have also studied the use of a passive system based on heat pipes to remove the decay 
heat in an SFP. They concluded that such a system would operate safely and prevent accidents even 
during the highest heat decay. The simulations conducted are only applicable to a CAP1400 reactor. 
Carasik et al. [56] have studied the design of an SFP that has a passive cooling feature. This design is 
the fluidised bed SFP. “A fluidised bed works by passing fluid or gas through a bed of granular solids 
at a high enough velocity to suspend the bed material, causing it to behave like a fluid” [56]. The 
conclusions drawn from simulations that were done from this design was that in addition to 
providing passive cooling, the fluidised bed SFP would also prevent reactivity accidents. The 
economics and other related components such as fuel movement design of such SFPs still need to be 
investigated in detail. Other reports have indicated that the main concern with SFPs is vulnerability 
to terrorist attacks [48] [54]. This can only be true for SFPs that are not located at reactor sites 
because reactor sites should be designed to withstand such attacks.  
The design of an SFP needs to provide an assurance that the systems of the SFP can withstand the 
effects of natural phenomena like earthquakes, design basis accidents and support of normal 
operations as well as the provision of fuel monitoring capabilities. A Westinghouse technology SFP, 
for instance, is designed to meet General Design Requirements (GDC) 2, 4, 61 and 63 prescribed by 
the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRC) in the United States. The first GDC give assurance for the 
ability to withstand the effects of natural phenomena [60].  
In summary, the following are critical considerations when designing a spent fuel pool: 
 Provision of cooling water monitoring capabilities. This includes key parameters in the SFP 
such as water level, temperature and radiation. The desired design is one that should enable 
monitoring of these parameters even with a total station blackout.  
 Ensuring sub-criticality at all times  
 Passive cooling. This has been a major subject of discussion and interest, especially after the 
Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011.  




 It is evident that SFPs will remain a vital interim storage technology for a number of years. It 
is therefore essential that designs are done to adapt to store expected future fuel designs. 
Spent fuel pools are designed to house the spent fuel for the duration of the reactor operation. The 
rate of filling up the SFPs depends on the fuel design, frequency of refuelling and the size of the SFP. 
Most of the SFPs in operation today were designed to be interim storage where the spent fuel would 
stay for a maximum of about 10 years before transportation for final disposal. The SFP technology 
has proven to be mature with one issue remaining, the introduction of efficient and cost-effective 
passive cooling systems.   
 
2.4. Dry cask storage  
 
It has been highlighted above that the increase in the amount of spent fuel in nuclear power plants 
is leading to decreased space in the SFPs. Dry cask storage facilities were designed to solve this 
challenge. Dry cask storage systems were initially designed for one purpose, to store the spent fuel 
after it has been cooled in the SFP with the intention to “buy” more time to find viable long term 
solutions. Others have argued that dry casks were initially designed to transport spent fuel to 
reprocessing facilities. In the United States, most dry casks were initially licenced to operate for 20 
years but were later extended to 40 years seeing that no long term solutions were agreed upon yet 
and that they posed no foreseeable technical danger [61]. The US NRC study on the casks has 
concluded that the casks can be used for up to 60 years. 
The nuclear industry has now developed and licenced dry cask storage facilities that are used for 
both transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel. Most of the transportation aspect has been 
from the reactor site to the reprocessing plant. Such casks are generally called dual-purpose dry 
casks. There have been proposals of multi-purpose casks which are expected to perform the storage, 
transportation and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. These are not yet licenced and most are in the 
design phase [62]. A variety of designs exists for dry cask storage facilities but most can be traced to 
have similar characteristics. The variation in design ranges from the purpose, orientation, material 
and siting [63]. General requirements of dry casks are similar to those of SFPs with few additions. 
These requirements include radiation containment, managing of decay heat, prevention of criticality, 
resistance to earthquakes, floods, etc. [64].  
Hambley et al. [62] give three general classifications of dry storage, namely the vault, casks and silos. 
Each category has a variety of designs within each category.  A vault is a large ferroconcrete 
structure with multiple large cavities used to store spent fuel. The external structure of a vault is 
used for radiation shielding. Heat removal is achieved through forced or natural air convection [65]. 
Below is a picture adapted from [66], showing the modular vault dry storage system at Paks nuclear 
plant in Hungary.  
 A vault storage system can be constructed above or below the ground. This dry storage system 
requires installations to be done in very stable geographic areas with high-level security and robust 
monitoring systems. It is desirable to have a vault storage system within the perimeter of the nuclear 




the spent fuel from the SFP to the vault dry storage system. Other countries that have employed 















Romanato [68] defines silos as “horizontal or vertical concrete cylinders with metallic canisters 
inside them”.  The spent fuel is stored in the canisters.  Natural air convection is used to cool the 
spent fuel using special ducts. In contrast to a building or structure in a vault system, the concrete 
provides radiation shielding and the metallic canisters perform the containment function. These 
have been deployed in countries such as Armenia, Korea and the United States of America [65]. 
Below is a picture of a NUHOMS (Nutek Horizontal Modular Storage) adapted from [69] showing a 
dry storage facility making use of silos. 





Figure 2-9: NUHOMS dry storage modular system [69] 
The dry cask technology has two major groups which include metal and concrete casks. It is clear 
that the design of such casks should ensure leak tightness and radiation shielding. The cooling of the 
fuel inside a dry cask is passive. A combination of heat conduction through solid materials and 
natural convection plays a role in heat removal. The use of concrete, lead, steel and other cask 
materials are used to provide radiation shielding. The geometry of the fuel assemblies inside the dry 
cask is designed to control criticality [48]. Dry casks also come in horizontal and vertical orientations. 
Dry cask storage, like spent fuel pools, can be Away-From-Reactor (AFR) or At-Reactor (AR). Most 
metal casks are used for both transportation and storage [70]. Countries such as Germany, the USA 
and Switzerland have already employed dry cask storage. Below is a picture showing typical metal 
and concrete casks, adapted from [68].  
 
 
Figure 2-10: Metal casks on the left and concrete casks on the right [68] 
A table detailing a CASTOR 440/84 metal cask parameters is given in appendix A and B along with a 
diagram showing major components of the cask;  both these are adapted from [70]. The design of 




spends in the SFP before it can be removed varies from country to country according to regulatory 
bodies. Excess water must be removed from the fuel prior to transporting it to a dry cask facility. 
This is done to decrease corrosion and pressure-related challenges [62].  
 
Dry storage systems provide the following: 
 Mobility,  
 modularity, and  
 passive cooling and shielding.  
Heat dissipation of a dry cask storage system is lower than that of an SFP and therefore cannot store 
fuel that has just been off-loaded from the reactor. It is also worth noting that the dry storage 
facilities at Fukushima nuclear power plant during the 2011 earthquake and tsunami remained intact 
and were reported not to have had any safety concerns [45].  
 
The IAEA [71] gives a comprehensive cost analysis for spent fuel storage where the above dry 
storage options are briefly analysed. The report identifies major categories of costs associated with 
spent fuel storage, i.e. capital costs, operational and maintenance costs (O&M), decontamination 
and decommissioning costs (D&D). Figure 2-11 from [71] further explains what each category 
comprises of: 
 
Figure 2-11: General categories of costs associated with spent fuel storage [71] 
 The capital costs of AR SFPs are included in the initial capital costs of the entire nuclear power 
station and work out cheaper due to other costs that would have been covered. These costs include 
land, security systems, transportation, etc. Spent fuel pools that are further from the reactor incur 
more capital costs, especially if it is at another site. The cost of spent fuel management varies from 




2.5. Reprocessing  
 
Reprocessing and recycling is one of the spent fuel management options in use today by several 
countries, including France, Japan, the United Kingdom, India and Russia. Other countries such as 
Switzerland, Belgium and Netherlands do not have reprocessing facilities but send their spent fuel 
for reprocessing. Switzerland sends their spent fuel for reprocessing in France and UK while Belgium 
and Netherlands send them to France [72] [73] [74]. This spent fuel management option is also 
referred to as reprocessing and recycling or closed fuel cycle. The justification and interest in the 
further development of reprocessing date back to the beginning of civil application of nuclear power 
in the early 1950s. The main idea was to recover the fissile material to be re-used in the fast breeder 
reactors, thereby making the economics of nuclear power more competitive [75] [28]. However, the 
first deployment was to recover plutonium for the production of weapons during World War II in the 
1940s [76].  
Reprocessing is primarily aimed at recovering the unburnt uranium (U-235), U-233 and plutonium 
(Pu-239). Plutonium is generated from the fertile Uranium (U-238) and Uranium-233 is bred from 
fertile Thorium. In [77], five key factors for reprocessing are highlighted.  These are optimising waste 
and disposal conditions, minimum impact on the environment, increasing economic competitiveness 
of nuclear power, increasing proliferation resistance and uranium resource conservation.  There are 
two processes used in reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. These are pyrochemical and 
hydrometallurgical (aqueous) processes.  
The end products of reprocessing are therefore Uranium, Plutonium and conditioned radioactive 
waste. The Uranium and Plutonium recovered are then fabricated to form MOX (Mixed-oxide) fuel 
which is then recycled in the pressurised water reactors. The use of MOX fuel assemblies requires 
minor changes in the reactor for its effective operation. This is due to the difference in the nuclear 
physics of uranium and plutonium. The isotopes of plutonium in reprocessed PWR fuel are Pu-238, 
Pu-239, PU-240, Pu-241 and Pu-242. The probability of fission is almost the same in fast reactors and 
only the odd-numbered isotopes in PWR. The neutron flux resonance region for MOX fuel is higher 
which effectively reduce the reactivity worth of control rods. This leads to a compromise in 
shutdown margins and hence a need for minor changes in the control rods in the reactor [78].  
The nuclear physics of the MOX fuel also vary in terms of the effect of delayed neutrons in 
comparison to that of uranium dioxide. The thermal absorption probability of the control rod is 
reduced in MOX fuel because the prompt neutron life is short [78].  
In comparison to the normal fabrication of uranium fuel, the MOX fuel fabrication is substantially 
costly and more hazardous. Twala [28] shows that reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel was accepted 
on the basis of promising economic competitiveness, which assumed certain conditions. However, 






2.6. Deep geological repository  
 
One of the current solutions to high-level nuclear waste is a deep geological repository (DGR). The 
US NRC defines a deep geological repository as an excavated underground facility designed, 
constructed and operated for safe and secure permanent disposal of high-level nuclear waste. A 
combination of engineered barrier systems, site’s natural geology and geochemical systems are used 
to isolate nuclear waste from the environment [47]. 
Canada is currently in the process of finalising a site for a deep geological repository. Finland’s deep 
geological repository in Olkiluoto is expected to be operational in 2023. Other countries such as 
Korea, Japan and France are in the engagement phase with local communities, members of civil 
society and all concerned parties with regard to siting of DGRs [79].  
Proposals of DGRs also include a reversibility feature wherein at a later stage the spent nuclear fuel 
can be retrieved to be reprocessed or completely destroyed. This is in the hope of finding technical 
solutions that would make reprocessing more viable or discoveries that could completely “destroy” 
the waste. It is not yet known how this reversibility feature impacts the cost and safety of the DGRs. 
The DGRs deploy the multi-barrier concept, which is summarised below: 
 (i). prevention of the release of radioactive waste, 
 (ii). delay of the release of radioactive waste, and   
 (iii). delay of the release and dilution of radioactive waste if they still escape to the environment 
despite the above.  
Below is a table adapted from [34] which shows functions of different barriers for DGRs. The 





Figure 2-12: Functional analysis of different DGR barriers [34]  
In many designs, the prevention of the release of radioactive waste is achieved by using glass or 
concrete to enclose the spent fuel in casks. Engineering barriers such as overpack and clay layer are 
used to protect the spent fuel packaging and delay any release of radionuclides. The dilution of 
radionuclides is achieved using the geological barrier which is the host rock. The designs will differ 
from site to site depending on the host rock, nuclear waste to be disposed and other factors. With 
the current technology, the DGRs need to confine the waste for at least 10 000 years for vitrified 
waste from reprocessing and more than 100000 years for waste directly from the open fuel cycle. 
The geological repository also requires not only the understanding of the long-term spent fuel 
behaviour but also the chemistry of the geology for that site. The geological chemistry of the site 












3. Aspects of physics and engineering of interim dry 
storage  
In this chapter, some of the most important physics and engineering aspects of dry cask storage are 
briefly discussed. These include radiation containment, spent fuel, sub-criticality, decay heat 
removal, site location aspects, corrosion of the casks, operability and monitoring.   
3.1. Radiation containment  
Radiation containment is about the retention of all radiation within the cask and prevention of any 
leaks into the environment. The current practice involves a multiple-barrier approach where the first 
shield is the cladding. The materials used to manufacture the casks then become second and third 
barriers of radiation. In some facilities, the casks are placed in buildings in order to add another 
barrier for radiation containment from the environment. The principle of radiation containment is 
based on the attenuation of the radiation as it interacts with matter. Radioactive nuclides emit 
different types of radiation which interact with matter in different ways. These include alpha, beta 
and gamma radiations.  
Alpha radiation is the emission of two protons and two neutrons at high speed/energy which are 
bound together into a particle like the helium nucleus [80]. This is called alpha decay and the two 
neutrons and two protons emitted would be called alpha particles, i.e. two protons and two 
neutrons make one alpha particle. In this phenomenon, both mass and charge is lost by the parent 
nucleus undergoing alpha decay. The mass decreases by four units while charge decreases by two. 
An example of alpha decay is that of a uranium-238 given by the following equation: 
𝑈 →  𝑇ℎ90
234  +  𝐻𝑒2
4 +  𝛾92
238  
 
 Beta decay is the emission of an electron or positron from the nucleus. This is a phenomenon that 
occurs in nuclides that are proton or neutron-rich. In a proton-rich nuclide, the proton is converted 
into a neutron with the emission of a positron and a neutrino. This is called beta plus decay and the 
positron is called the beta plus particle. In a neutron-rich nuclide, the neutron is converted into a 
proton with the emission of an electron and an antineutrino. This is called beta minus (𝛽−) decay 
and the electron emitted is called a beta minus particle. In both beta minus and plus decays, the 
mass number remains unchanged while the atomic number of the nuclide increase or decrease by 
one, respectively. Beta decay can be summarized by the following equations, which represent the 
conversion of the neutron into a proton or vice versa with the release of leptons and anti-leptons. 
𝑛 → 𝑝 + 𝑒− +  ?̅?  … Beta minus decay 
𝑝 → 𝑛 + 𝑒+ + 𝑣 … Beta plus decay 
Examples of beta minus decay and beta plus decays are that of carbon-14 decaying to Nitrogen-14 
and carbon-10 decaying to boron-10 respectively. The equations of these processes are given as 
follows: 








10  →  𝐵5
10 + 𝑣 + 𝑒+ 
 
Gamma radiation comprises of emission of high energy photons. The number of nucleons is not 
altered during gamma decay. Gamma radiation usually follows beta and alpha decays. This process 
generally starts with a neutron captured by a target nucleus to form a compound nucleus in an 
excited state which decays by emitting gamma rays. An example is the formation of U-239 by 
capturing a neutron. This phenomenon is expressed below:  
𝑛 + 𝑈 →92
238  𝑈∗92
239  … Formation of the excited compound 
𝑈∗  → 92
239 𝑈92
239 +  𝛾… De-excitation of the excited compound  
 
All these processes are radioactive decay phenomena for unstable nuclides. The interaction of 
radiation with matter can be broadly divided into three groups. These are the interaction of 
radiation with charged particles, photons and neutral particles.  All these see matter in terms of its 
basic constituents, which are electrons, neutrons and protons [81].  
3.1.1. Charged particles  
Interaction of charged particles with matter is usually presented as two groups, heavy charged 
particles which include alphas, protons, muons and pions and light charged particles which include 
electrons and positrons.  All charged particles interact with matter primarily by electromagnetic 
force. Charged particles continuously lose energy and are deflected from their incident direction as 
they pass through matter. Both inelastic collisions and elastic scattering are the driving processes 
behind the energy loss and deflection from the incident direction of the charged particles. The 
inelastic collisions occur with the atomic electrons of the material which the particle interacts with, 
and elastic scattering occurs from the nuclei of the material. The inelastic collision is primarily 
responsible for the energy loss of these charged particles. The distance travelled by charged particles 
through the material before they lose all their energy is called the range of the particle.  
Heavy charged particles transfer their energy into the matter during the inelastic collision, thereby 
causing ionisation or excitation of the atoms of the matter they interact with. The rate at which a 
particle loses energy per unit length as it interacts with matter is called the stopping power of the 
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Table 3-1: Bethe-Bloch formula parameters 
𝑣 =  𝛽𝑐 Ion velocity  
𝑧𝑒 Ion charge  
𝑚 Mass of the electron  
𝑁𝐴 Avogadro’s constant = 6.02214086 x 10
23 
𝐴 Atomic mass number of the stopping material 
𝑍 Atomic number of the stopping material 
𝜌 Density of the stopping material  
𝐼 Mean ionization energy  
  
The negative sign indicates the fact that the energy of the particle decreases with distance. It is 
common to give the stopping power value in units of energy loss per mass per unit area by dividing 
by the density, 𝜌. This is called mass stopping power. Tables of range and stopping power have been 
computed but further analysis can be used to understand the effects of changing variables in the 
Bethe-Bloch equation. These variables include the particle’s energy, particle type as well as the 
stopping medium.  
The variation of the mass stopping power of protons in an aluminium medium is given in Figure 3-1, 
adapted from [42]. The variation shape is typical for any charged particle in any medium.  Both 
scales in the figure are logarithmic.  
  
Figure 3-1: The variation of mass stopping power of protons in aluminium medium [42] 
As seen in Figure 3-1 above, the energy dependence is dominated by the  
1
𝑣2
 term between energies 
of approximately 1 MeV and 1GeV. In this region, the mass stopping power can be approximated 










The value of 𝑘 is approximately 0.8. A heavy charged particle will travel through a medium starting 
with some energy until it loses all its energy i.e. the energy changes of the particle will move from 
right to the left of Figure 3-1. The rate of energy loss increases as the particle energy decreases, 
thereby increasing the number of ions in the medium per unit distance. This number of ions 
produced per unit distance is called ionization density, which increases along the path of the particle. 
The ionization density will be at its highest just before the particle goes to rest after losing all its 
energy. The particle’s energy will go to zero, thereby defining the range. The plot of the ionization 
density against the distance travelled is called the Bragg curve. It is not discussed here in detail but 
worth mentioning that the treatment of some localized tumours is based on the enhancement of 
ionization in the Bragg peak using heavy charged particles. A Bragg curve is shown in Figure 3-2 
below, adapted from [82].  
 
Figure 3-2: Bragg curve for protons adapted from [82] 
The light charged particles also interact in a similar manner as the heavy charged particles with the 
exception of their high speed due to their very light mass. This makes them have a much smaller 
stopping power in comparison to heavy charged particles and much more penetrating.  Electrons 
also lose more energy in a single collision when compared to heavy charged particles due to their 
light mass. Their paths are also erratic due to large deflections they experience when they collide 
with other electrons. These collisions also cause sudden changes in the direction and speed, which 
result in the emission of electromagnetic radiation. This is called bremsstrahlung radiation. The total 
energy loss for electrons is, therefore, due to collisions with electrons of the medium and radiated 
energy [82] [42] [81]. 
3.1.2. Photons  
There are 3 possible interactions from photons, namely, photoelectric effect, Compton scattering 
and pair production. The lack of electric charge in the photons makes them different from the rest. 
Photoelectric effect is when the energy of the photon is converted into releasing an electron from 
the atom, typically in one of the inner electron shells of the atom. The atom may then de-excite by 
releasing less tightly bound electrons. These electrons are called Auger electron. In some instances, 
an electron from a higher shell fills that vacancy in the inner shell with a release of an X-ray photon 




electron that gets released from the inner shell called the photoelectron would have kinetic energy 
given by the following equation:  
𝐾𝑒 =  𝐸𝛾 −  𝐵𝑒,  
where 𝐸𝛾  is the incident photon’s energy and 𝐵𝑒  is the binding energy of the electron. This 
phenomenon is for low-energy photons of less than 0.1 MeV. In Compton scattering, an incident 
photon with energy 𝐸𝛾 scatters from a nearly free electron. The photon emerges with less energy 
𝐸′𝛾 and the electron scatters with kinetic energy 𝑇. This kinetic energy is expressed as follows: 
𝑇 =  𝐸𝛾 − 𝐸′𝛾. 
The scattered photon’s energy is given by the following equation: 
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Theta, 𝜃 is the angle between the incident photon path and the scattered photon path. The 
scattered photon’s energy will be at its minimum when the angle between the scattered photon 
path and incident photon’s path, 𝜃 is 180° and maximum when 𝜃 is 0°.  Compton scattering is 
dominant in photons of energies between 0.1 MeV and 10 MeV. The derivation of the scattered 
photon’s energy is given in appendix A. Compton scattering is not as dependent on the atomic 
number Z and incident photon’s energy 𝐸𝛾 as the photoelectric effect.  
Pair production is when the entire incident photon’s energy is transformed to form an electron-
positron pair. The total kinetic energy is given by the following equation: 
𝐾−𝑒 +  𝐾+𝑒 = 𝐸𝛾 − 2𝑚𝑐
2 
The two terms on the left, 𝐾−𝑒 and 𝐾+𝑒 are the electron and positron kinetic energies respectively, 
𝐸𝛾 is the incident photon’s energy, m mass of the electron and c is the speed of light. This pair 
production energy equation shows that there is a minimum incident photon energy threshold for 
this interaction to take place. This energy threshold is 2𝑚𝑐2 = 1.022MeV. This interaction is 
therefore only dominant for photons of energies approximately above 10 MeV. The presence of a 
heavy nucleus is also required for the conservation of both momentum and energy in order for this 
process to take place. This makes pair production to have some independence on the atomic 
number Z.  
The remaining incident photon energy which does not get transferred to the absorbing medium 
during the interaction will be in the form of rest masses of electron and positron. The positron will 
slow down and get attracted to an electron just before it comes to rest. The interaction of these two 
will result in annihilation in which the rest masses of the positron and the electron are converted 
into 2 gamma rays. These gamma rays will each have energy of 0.511 MeV and will be emitted in 
opposite directions. This will ensure that momentum is conserved and may, in turn, interact with 
absorbing medium by either photoelectric absorption or Compton scattering as explained above. 





The interaction of neutrons with matter is dependent on the neutron’s energy and the type of nuclei 
they interact with. Neutrons do not experience Coulomb repulsion force as they approach a nucleus 
due to the fact that they are neutrally charged. Thus neutrons will travel in straight paths and will 
either scatter or be absorbed in the medium. In the former, the neutron’s energy is lost in successive 
collisions.   The scattering process can either be elastic or inelastic. In elastic scattering, the total 
kinetic energy between the neutron and the nucleus it interacts with is conserved. The inelastic 
scattering process leaves the nucleus in an excited state which may later decay by gamma radiation. 
This is possible when the neutron has sufficient energy to excite the nucleus.  
The absorption process can occur via different reactions, namely, radiative capture, fission and other 
reactions (n, x). In a radiative capture process, a neutron is absorbed into the nucleus, thereby 
forming the higher next isotope in an excited state of energy. The newly formed higher isotope will 
de-excite by emitting gamma rays. Fission reaction is when a nucleus splits into two fission 
fragments as a result of absorbing a neutron with the release of a couple of neutrons. Other 
reactions, (n,x) is when the interaction of the nucleus with the neutron results in the emission of x 
charged particle. The possible particle x includes alpha, neutron, proton, deuteron, etc. If the 
emitted particle is an alpha, the reaction would be written as (𝑛, 𝛼). The dependency of the 
interaction of neutron with matter on the neutron’s energy has led to the classification of the 
neutrons in terms of their energies. These are given in Table 3-2 below.  
Table 3-2: Neutrons according to their energy 
Class  Energy 
Thermal neutrons ~ 0.025 eV 
Epithermal neutrons ~ 0.1 – 100 keV 
Fast neutron ~100keV – 100 MeV 
High energy neutrons E > 100 MeV  
  
The main summary that can be deduced from the discussion above is that radiation interacts with 
matter on the basis of seeing matter at its basic constituents, which are nuclei and electrons. The 
structure of the matter at its atomic level can be altered and in many cases, it is not a desired 
alteration. The effect of radiation on matter is dependent on the type of radiation, energy, intensity 
and the material (medium) which the radiation interacts with. The biological effects on living things 
exposed to these radiations can be either direct or indirect action. Direct action refers to the 
irreversible biological damage of living tissue as a result of interaction with highly ionizing particles 
[42].    
Indirect action begins with ionization of simpler molecules which creates chemically active free 
radicals. A free radical is an atom, ion or a molecule with no paired valence electron in the outer 
shell [83]. These free radicals are chemically reactive and diffuse longer distances to reach atoms of 




of radiation on living tissue dominates the total disruption arising from radiation. The results are the 
changes in biologically complex systems such as chromosomes or genetic mutation [42].  
There are a couple of concepts that have been developed to characterize the damage of radiation on 
matter. These include absorbed dose, equivalent dose and effective dose. Absorbed dose (D) is the 
absorbed radiation energy per unit mass and is measured in Gray (Gy), where 1 Gray equals 1 Joule 
per kilogram. In radiation protection, the average absorbed dose (𝐷𝑇) for a tissue or organ is 
preferred as it gives a better characterization. This would be given by the following formula:  




where 𝜀𝑇 is the total energy deposited in a tissue or an organ and 𝑚𝑇 is the mass of the tissue or the 
organ. Certain molecules such as DNA in organisms have repair mechanisms that occur when they 
have not been too damaged. This makes the biological effects of radiation to be dependent on the 
rate of dose absorbed in the tissue. Thus, a dose that could damage 100% of a given population of 
cells can be applied in fragments in a slow rate to reduce the number of cells damaged. Another 
concept used to characterize radiation damage in tissue is the relative biological effectiveness (RBE) 
which refers to the biological response to a given radiation dose relative to that induced by 250-keV 
X-rays or gamma rays [42]. The RBE is radiation energy dependent and therefore complicated to 
work with in practice which has led to the establishment of radiation weighting factor, 𝑤𝑅. This is 
given in Table 3-3 which is adapted from [84] and [42]. The weighting factor is obtained by averaging 
the RBE over a range of energies for particular radiation [42].  
Equivalent dose (H) is a quantity used to indicate the biological effects of radiation exposure [42] 
[84]. The equation used to calculate the equivalent dose is given below: 
𝐻𝑇 =  𝑤𝑅  × 𝐷𝑇,𝑅 
The subscript T represent tissue, 𝐷𝑇,𝑅 is the average absorbed dose in tissue T for a given specific 
radiation R. The equivalent dose is measured in Sievert (Sv). If the issue is exposed to multiple types 
of radiation, the equivalent dose is given by a weighted sum of all radiation types contributions. 
Different parts of the body have different sensitivity to radiation and have therefore been given 
tissue weighting factor, 𝑤𝑇. This weighting factor is used to calculate an effective dose, E, which 
specifies the sum of the equivalent doses to different tissues in the body. The effective dose is given 
by the following formula: 








Table 3-3: Radiation weighting factors adapted from [84] and [42]  
Radiation type Energy (MeV) Radiation weighting factor  
Photons All energies 1 
Electrons and muons All energies 1 
Protons and charged pions  2 
Alpha particles, fission fragments, heavy 
ions 
 20 
Neutrons < 0.01 5 
0.01 – 0.1 10 
0.1 – 2 20 
2 - 20 10 
>20 5 
 
Some of the weighting factors for specific body organs adapted from [84] are given in Table 3-4 
below.  
Table 3-4: Weighting factor for some of the body organs adapted from [84].  





The goal of radiation containment in dry casks is therefore to ensure that all radiation in the SFAs is 
retained within the casks. The governing formula is given as follows:  
𝐼(𝑥) =  𝐼0 𝑒
−𝜇𝑥  
Where:  
 𝐼(𝑥) −  𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑥  
𝐼0 −  𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦  
𝜇 − 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑎𝑙  




Table 3-5 below shows some of the commonly used materials to achieve gamma radiation shielding 
in the casks. The desired material must have the highest linear attenuation coefficient and provide a 
practical way to be incorporated in the cask design. The material must also be able to withstand 
other phenomena such as temperature fluctuation and pressure.   
Table 3-5: Linear attenuation coefficient of different materials at different gamma energies [80] 






Lead 59.7 10.15 1.64 
Air  0.000195 0.000159 0.000112 
Water  0.167 0.136 0.097 
Aluminum  0.435 0.324 0.227 
Iron  2.72 1.09 0.655 
Carbon  0.335 0.274 0.196 
 
The desirable dose rates for the casks are those whose effects on human and the environment are 
minimal. The principle of ALARA (As low as reasonably achievable) is used in nuclear facilities to 
minimize radiation doses and limit the release of radiation into the environment.  The maximum 
dose rates have been calculated and recommended by international organizations such as the 
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). These are given in the table below and 
the current achievable dose rate limits for some of the casks are tabulated. The units used for the 
dose limits as seem in Table 3-6 are milliSieverts (mSv) and millirem (mrem). The former (Sievert) is 
the SI unit for effective dose and is related to roentgen equivalent man (rem) by the following 
equation: 1 Sievert = 100 rem. These effective dose is the measure of the amount of radiation 
absorbed and its biological effects [87] [88].  















Whole body 20 1 35 mrem/hr  20 mrem per 
hour  
191.26 





3.2. Spent fuel  
During the feasibility study of interim dry storage, the spent fuel is not only a vital aspect to be 
analyzed in detail but one of the first because it determines a lot of other decisions. There are two 
main aspects of spent fuel, namely, the quantity and characteristics of the spent fuel. The spent fuel 
quantity determines the size of the required casks and the facility. This quantity can either be the 
number of the spent nuclear fuel assembly expected at the end of the power station’s lifespan or a 
fraction of those spent nuclear fuel assemblies in a case of other plans such as reprocessing at a later 
stage.  The physical properties such as the dimensions of the SFAs and shapes are also part 
information analyzed in the design of the casks.  
In [71], some of the most important characteristics of spent nuclear fuel to be considered include 
the type of fuel, burnup, required minimum cooling time in the SFP, condition of the fuel cladding, 
radionuclides inventory and activity. An analysis of the spent fuel characteristics also includes 
damaged fuel which may require special designs for the casks. This information allows for the 
prediction of long term spent fuel behaviour which is one of the critical inputs in the design of casks 
for optimum performance.  The radionuclide inventory depends on the fuel type, fuel cycle and 
neutron flux. The inventory will, in turn, determine the activity of the spent fuel.  
3.3. Sub-criticality  
One of the key aspects of safe spent fuel management is ensuring sub-criticality of the spent fuel. 
Criticality in nuclear reactors refers to a condition where the number of neutrons produced by 
fission in one generation equals the number produced in the preceding generation. This is the 
condition required for a sustained nuclear fission chain reaction. This condition corresponds to a 
value of 𝑘𝑒𝑓𝑓 , the effective multiplication factor equals to 1 and reactivity, 𝜌  equals to 0. 
Mathematically, the effective multiplication factor can be defined as follows:  
 
𝑘𝑒𝑓𝑓 =  
𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
 
If the neutrons produced are greater than the neutrons absorbed and leaked, the reactor is said to 
be supercritical which corresponds to an effective multiplication factor of greater than one. This will 
result in a neutron flux increase in every generation. If the neutrons produced are less than the 
absorption and leakage, the value of 𝑘𝑒𝑓𝑓 will be less than one. The neutron flux will decrease in 
each generation and, the reactor will be said to be sub-critical. The effective multiplication factor is 
therefore expressed as follows:  
𝑘𝑒𝑓𝑓 =  𝜀. 𝑝. 𝑓. 𝜂. 𝑙𝑓 . 𝑙𝑡   , where  
 
𝜀 = fast fission factor = 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
 
 
 𝑝 = 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛
 
 
 𝑓 = thermal utilization factor = 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 






𝜂 = reproduction factor = 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 
 
 
𝑙𝑓 = fast non-leakage probability = 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
 
 
 𝑙𝑡 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
 
=  
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
 
The desired state for the spent fuel is sub-criticality, which will ensure that no further nuclear fission 
takes place. The spent fuel contains approximately between 1 and 1.5% of fissile material in the form 
of U-235 and U-239 [82]. This makes it a necessity to incorporate sub-criticality conditions in the cask 
design. This is achieved by either removing the neutrons in the spent fuel or creating a condition for 
them not to cause fission. The “removal” of neutrons is done by using neutron-absorbing materials 
when designing the casks. Examples of neutron-absorbing materials include boron, gadolinium, 
hafnium and cadmium. These are materials with high neutron absorption cross-section for thermal 
neutrons.  While these have some of the highest thermal neutron absorption cross-sections, they 
can also increase moderation of fast neutrons to thermal neutrons. This can result in absorption of 
these thermal neutrons in the remaining fissile material of the waste, thereby initiating another 
nuclear chain reaction. The design is therefore critical to ensure that the materials perform the 
function of absorption effectively and dominate any possible moderation that can initiate a chain 
reaction.  
Table 3-7: Typical materials used for thermal neutron absorption [85]. 
Material  Thermal neutron 
absorption cross-
section (barns)  
Possible forms in which they 




259 000 Aqueous  Poor corrosion resistance 
Boron-10 3800 Boral steel, borated concrete, 
borated polythene 
Helium buildup thereby 
increasing pressure in 
cask 
Chlorine-37  100 Polyvinyl Chlorine (PVC) Degrades quicker  
Hafnium-177 7200 Hafnium boride, alloys of 
hafnium and zirconium  
 
Cadmium-113 62 000  High cost  
   
Most parts of the internals of the casks are therefore made from neutron-absorbing materials in 
order to ensure sub-criticality. These neutron-absorbing materials are also called neutron poisons. 
The other solution in achieving sub-criticality is spacing the spent fuel assemblies sufficiently far 
apart from each other. This is to increase the distance a neutron would have to travel before it 
interacts with a fissile uranium atom. The further apart the fuel assemblies are, the better the 




casks as well as the cost. Others [86] have suggested decreasing the value of the effective 
multiplication factor by coating the spent fuel rods with neutron absorbing material before loading 
them into the casks. This would create an additional neutron absorbing capabilities in the casks.  
The need to maintain the effective multiplication factor at unity during operation of the reactor and 
the ability to monitor any change gives a need for expression of reactivity in terms of the effective 





The generally accepted value of the multiplication factor to ensure sub criticality is a value of no 
greater than 0.95. In [87], the multiplication factor of 0.95 is said to include all uncertainties 
benchmarking and calculated with 95% probability at 95% confidence level. If the maximum allowed 
multiplication factor is 0.95, the corresponding value of ρ will be -0.05. The traditional analysis of 
criticality of spent nuclear fuel assumes that the fissile nuclide is at its highest reactivity as the fresh 
fuel with the highest enrichment and no irradiation. This has allowed for the over-conservative 
design of spent fuel pools and casks. Designs of spent fuel pools and casks are now taking into 
account the irradiation of the spent fuel by applying the concept of burnup credit. This allows for 
dense spent fuel placement into the casks but requires detail calculations and analysis of the spent 
fuel to be done. If the burn-up credit approach is employed, detailed criticality analysis must be 
demonstrated.  
3.4. Decay heat removal  
The engineering approach on the safety of spent nuclear fuel is based on the concept of defence-in-
depth philosophy. This is an application of different barriers to prevent accidents and incidents from 
occurring or minimize the effects if an accident occurs. As discussed above, the primary containment 
barrier in spent fuel is the cladding. However, like any material, the optimum performance of the 
cladding can only be achieved within certain conditions. One of those conditions is an acceptable 
temperature range. Once the temperature exceeds a certain threshold, the integrity of the fuel 
cladding is compromised and this can result in the escape of the radionuclides. This, therefore, 
makes efficient decay heat removal from the SFAs one of the most important factors in dry storage 
facilities.  
It has been highlighted that the spent nuclear fuel comprises of 3 types of nuclides, namely, 
actinides, fission products and activation products. The actinides and fission products continue to 
release energy that is converted to heat as they decay in various phenomena explained in 3.1 above. 





Figure 3-3: Typical variation of cladding temperature at different fuel life cycle [88] 
Although no indication of specific time frame has been made in Figure 3-3 above, typical time frames 
can be allocated to these fuel cycles. A typical nuclear power station time profile for this figure will, 
therefore, be as follows:  
Table 3-8: Typical time frame for fuel life cycles at a nuclear power plant 











or disposal  
Time 
(months)  
54 120  0.2 120 - 600 1 
  
The in-reactor burnup is certain with exceptions of damaged fuel that gets removed before the end 
of the full 18-month cycle. Yang [89] points out that continued fuel design improvements have 
brought the number of damaged fuel rods to less than 0.1%, i.e. on average, 99.99% of the fuel rods 
remain in the reactor for the planned duration with no damage. This is a significant improvement 
from a big portion of fuel rods and sometimes the whole core in the 1970s.   
The interim dry storage can range from 10 years to 50 years (lifespan of the casks) depending on 
whether there is a final disposal strategy yet. The time required for the transportation of the spent 
fuel for reprocessing or to repository facility is also dependent on the destination and transportation 
mode used. From Figure 3-3 above, the vacuum drying method is critical as it can raise the cladding 
temperature to values even higher than the temperature while in the reactor. However, the vacuum 
drying is not discussed in detail in this dissertation mainly because the most important heat to 
remove is the decay heat, resulting from radioactive decay of fission products.   
This decay heat must be evacuated from the spent fuel assembly in dry casks to prevent damaging 
the fuel cladding and the casks. The dry casks use passive heat removal methods. This is an 
important aspect of dry cask storage as it eliminates the need for active power supply and 
mechanical devices. The passive heat removal methods used are conduction, convection and 





Figure 3-4: Concrete cask overview adapted from [90] 
The spent fuel assemblies are in contact with the canister usually made of stainless steel. Heat is 
therefore conducted out of the cask. Most cask designs have air inlets and outlets as seen in Figure 
3-4 that allow for air to flow naturally into the cask, thereby cooling the canister. The air does not 
flow into the canister but flows into the bottom of the cask and out at the top outlet of the cask. The 
heat from the cask would then be ejected into the atmosphere. Most of the decay heat is ejected 
through this natural convection of air flowing through the passage from the bottom inlet to the top 
outlet. However, some of the heat is ejected via conduction transfer through the outer concrete 
surface. Casks are designed to evacuate a certain amount of heat which limits the number of spent 
fuel assemblies that can be loaded in the casks. Computer programs such as computational fluid 
dynamics and COBRA (Cooling & Boiling in Rod Arrays) are used to design and verify heat transfer 
and cask performance. The design must cater for normal, abnormal and accident conditions. Causes 
of abnormal and accident conditions would generally range from air inlets and outlets blockage to 
fires and earthquakes.  
The detailed thermal design and characterization are not discussed here but the basics are briefly 
presented. Kim et al. [91] highlight some of the key parameters in heat removal and transfer which 
include temperature rise between the air inlet and outlet, air velocity, air mass flow rate and 









Table 3-9: Some of the key parameters in the thermal performance of dry casks 
?̇? Overall air mass flow rate (kg/s) 




𝐴 Cross-sectional area of the air outlet (𝑚2 ) 




∆𝑇 Differential air temperature between inlet and outlet ( 𝐾)  




ℎ Natural convective heat transfer coefficient  
𝑇𝑆 Temperature at the surface of the cask 
𝑇𝐴 Ambient temperature  
𝜎 Stefan-Boltzmann constant = 5.67 ×  10−8𝑘𝑔 𝑠−3𝐾−4 
𝜀 Emissivity of the exterior surface of the overpack 
𝐴𝑠 Surface area of the overpack 
 
Using the parameters given in Table 3-9, the following equations are used to understand the basics 
of decay heat removals in casks. These are adapted from [92]. The overall mass flow rate of air in the 
cask is given as: 
?̇? =  𝜌𝑢𝐴  
It follows that the heat, 𝑄𝐴 that is transferred into the atmosphere through the flow of the air via 
the bottom inlet and out the top outlet is given by: 
𝑄𝐴 =  ?̇?𝐶𝑃∆𝑇 
The heat transferred into the atmosphere from the surface of the cask is given as follows:  
𝑄𝑠 = ℎ𝐴(𝑇𝑆 − 𝑇𝐴) +  𝜎𝜀𝐴𝑆(𝑇𝑆
4 − 𝑇𝐴
4) 
Decay heat generated by the spent fuel assemblies can be measured and is generally axially non-
uniform. This is due to non-uniform burnup in the fuel assemblies [92]. The Wooten-Epstein model, 
presented in [93], predicts net radial heat transfer from the SFA. The model takes into account the 
radiative and conduction heat exchange. It is given by the following heat flow equation: 
𝑄𝑤𝑒 =  𝜎 𝐶0 𝐹𝜀𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐴 [𝑇𝐶
4 −  𝑇𝐵
4] + 13.5740 𝐿𝐾𝐶𝑆[𝑇𝐶 − 𝑇𝐵] 
The parameters are defined in the below: 








, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑁 𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛. 
𝑁 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦  




𝐿 = 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑦  
𝐾𝐶𝑆 = 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦  
𝑇𝐶 = ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑇𝐵 = 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑦 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒  
𝑄𝑊𝐸 = 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝐹𝐴 
𝜀𝐶  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜀𝐵 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦  
𝜎 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 Table 3-9. 
 
3.5. Site location aspects  
Although not necessarily a physics and engineering aspect, the site for the cask it is essential. The 
site must have an adequate footprint for the facility and provide ease of access for whatever means 
of transport chosen to transport the casks. The decision to place the dry storage facilities within the 
power plant site reduces legal and regulation approval timelines. This can then give more time for 
the design phase.  The soil type at the location of the facility may cause an increase in construction 
of the dry cask storage if more civil works are carried out. The knowledge of the site’s peak ground 
acceleration (PGA) is also a major input in designing of the cask. PGA refers to the maximum ground 
acceleration at a location during an earthquake event. Earthquake-induced ground movements 
occur in vertical and horizontal directions. In many cases, the horizontal component (peak horizontal 
ground acceleration) is larger than the vertical component and hence its use in many engineering 
applications. The use of PGA is discussed further in 3.6. PGA is expressed in g, the gravitational 
acceleration, where 1𝑔 = 9.81 𝑚/𝑠2. The effective peak acceleration (EPA) which refers to the 
maximum ground acceleration to which buildings corresponds is used in seismic engineering. This 
value is typically between 
2
3
  to 
3
4
 of the PGA [94]. In a case where the dry cask storage is installed in 
the nuclear power station site, these would be known already.   
3.6. Response to seismic events 
 The dry casks are placed on concrete pads designed to support the casks when loaded with the 
spent fuel. This is shown in Figure 3-5 below. In contrast to other civil structures, dry casks are free-
standing and not anchored. They are susceptible to motions of different kinds due to man-made 
hazards or natural phenomena such as earthquakes which cause ground movements. These motions 
have been classified into 3 main categories, namely, rocking, sliding and a combination of both 
rocking and sliding [94]. The factors that influence the response of the casks to ground shaking 
include the following: 
 Radius to centre height ratio of the cask 
 The friction between cask and pad 
 Characteristics of ground shaking motion such as amplitude, duration, etc 
These motions can result in casks collisions against each other if the horizontal displacement is large 
enough.  The damage from these collisions can result in a compromise of the structural integrity of 
the casks thereby releasing the radioactive material. Dangol [94] shows that sliding motion will occur 





Figure 3-5: Dry cask on a pad adapted from [95] 
This can be expressed in the following equation:  
𝜇𝑓𝑐(𝑚𝑔 − 𝑚𝑎𝑣) < 𝑚𝑎ℎ   
Where 𝜇𝑓𝑐  is the friction coefficient, 𝑎ℎ  and 𝑎𝑣  are the horizontal and vertical accelerations 
respectively, 𝑔 is the gravitational acceleration and 𝑚 is the mass of the cask. The equation can 
further be expressed as follows: 




Dangol [94] further shows that the governing equation for a cask to fall is given by the following 
equation: (𝑚𝑔 − 𝑚𝑎𝑣)𝑟 < 𝑚𝑎ℎℎ𝑑ℎ, where r is the radius of the cask and ℎ𝑑ℎ  is the diameter to 





𝑔 −  𝑎𝑣
 
The above equations show that the friction coefficient and height to diameter ratio of the cask are 
important factors in the casks responding to ground movements. The design must, therefore, ensure 
that the casks can withstand these vertical and horizontal ground movements. Hartnick [96] also 
shows that casks with higher diameter to height ratios can withstand higher horizontal acceleration. 
The casks can also be subjected to ground movements due to explosion-induced shock. In such cases, 
the vertical ground acceleration component is usually higher than the horizontal component.  
3.7. Corrosion of the casks  
Spent fuel casks are subjected to the phenomenon of corrosion, which is the interaction between 
materials and the environment resulting in the degradation of the properties of the material. This 
interaction results in a formation of oxide or/and hydrated-oxide compounds on the surface of the 
metal. The casks are generally prone to two types of corrosion mechanisms which are stress 




with each other. Their environments make them susceptible to chloride stress corrosion cracking 
(CSCC) because of the presence of chloride ions [97] in the vicinity of the sea. Other factors required 
for this phenomenon to take place are the presence of tensile stress and elevated temperatures [97].  
In [98], Enos and Bryan show that residual tensile stresses exist near welds on the body of the cask 
for welded casks. This corrosion can, therefore, result in component failure.  
It is therefore essential to have robust monitoring and inspections of the cask continuously to pick 
up these developments in the casks and initiate remedial actions.  The phenomenon of corrosion can 
be addressed by using materials that are less reactive with oxygen and employing cask 
manufacturing processes that reduced tensile stress but still deliver quality casks. Aluminium, on the 
other hand, is very reactive with oxygen thereby encouraging corrosion. However, it reacts faster 
with the oxygen in the air to form an aluminium oxide which is unreactive. This aluminium oxide 
forms a thin layer at the surface of the material and thereby preventing cracks and further corrosion. 
This has been applied at Paks storage facility where the fuel storage tubes (FST) have been sprayed 
with aluminium coating [99].  Another method used to counteract corrosion is galvanizing. This is a 
method where a corrosion-susceptible material such as iron is covered with a more reactive metal 
like zinc. The zinc and oxygen will form a zinc oxide layer thereby preventing corrosion on the 
covered metal   
 
3.8. Transportation infrastructure  
The transportation of the cask from the SFPs to the dry storage facility is also a vital component of 
safe spent fuel management. It needs a reliable and suitable transportation infrastructure. These 
infrastructures include a well-engineered route (for ground transport) and suitable trucks or ships if 
sea transportation is utilized. The planning of the transportation infrastructures should also consider 
possible transportation from the interim storage to a centralized storage or reprocessing facility in 
the future. This is important for countries such as South Africa that have not decided on the final 
disposal strategy yet.  
 
3.9. Operability  
The facility needs to provide ease of operation of the facility throughout its life span. This includes 
continuous monitoring and maintenance, which could also involve personnel to do visual inspection 
on the casks. This will then require the knowledge of the dosage that personnel can pick up when 
working in this storage facility. The facility, therefore, should not only provide sufficient physical 
space for personnel to work around but also ensure the dose limits are not exceeded. A dry storage 
facility has less maintenance compared to wet storage facilities. This is due to their nature of 
providing passive cooling as discussed in chapter 2. The tools and equipment used for maintenance 
activities can, therefore, remain unused for extended period of time. It is important to regularly 
check their functionality and maintain them as well in order to ensure their reliability when needed 
to perform. In [100], other operability factors to be considered are highlighted. These include fail-





The cask selection for countries which have not decided on the final disposal strategy must also 
incorporate retrievability of spent fuel. This is to keep the option for future reprocessing if 
economics become favourable. However, this option can compromise the safety of the casks.  
 
3.10. Monitoring  
Any action required to avert abnormal conditions or incidents and accidents is preceded by 
knowledge of the system conditions. Monitoring also forms a backbone of safe spent fuel 
management. The monitoring includes temperature, pressure and radiation. The parameters 
monitored must be recorded and analyzed regularly to track any changes. The monitoring 
information and reports analyzed by the operators should not only be sent to the relevant chief 
technical staff of the plant, but also to both national and international regulatory bodies. These 
would include the National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) and international organizations such as IAEA, 
WANO, etc. The purpose of these submissions would be to prove that the performance of the casks 
is within the expected and agreed standards. A technical sound plan should be submitted should a 




















4. Evaluation of existing interim dry storage facilities  
 
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter gives a brief evaluation of the existing interim dry storage facilities in operation from 3 
countries. The evaluation of these facilities focuses on some of the unique physics and engineering 
aspects found in these facilities. The facilities presented here are the Connecticut Yankee in the USA, 
Paks in Hungary and Doel in Belgium. The chapter presents a general overview of the facility, 
location, technology in use and the characteristics of the spent fuel to be stored in these facilities. All 
these facilities have been in operation for at least five years, and they use different casks, which 
diversify the analysis in this chapter.   
4.2. Connecticut Yankee spent fuel storage facility  
4.2.1. General overview of the facility  
The Connecticut Yankee dry cask storage facility was built to store spent nuclear fuel from 
Connecticut Yankee nuclear power station, formally known as Haddam Neck Nuclear power plant.  
The Connecticut Yankee nuclear power station is located in Connecticut, about 200 km northeast of 
New York City in the United States. The nuclear power station operated for 28 years with an installed 
capacity of 619 MWe. It was shut down in 1996 and decommissioned between 1998 and 2007. The 
power station is said to have been shut down for economic reasons [101]. The dry storage facility 
has stored 1019 spent fuel assemblies [102] [103]. The construction was completed in 2002, and the 
transfer of the fuel from the spent fuel pools was done between May 2004 and March 2005. It is 
reported to have taken 3 years from procurement of materials to completion (transfer of the spent 
fuel) of the project [102]. 
4.2.2. Location and physical dimensions  
The facility is located in the power station property, which is about 500 m from the decommissioned 
reactor site. It occupies an area of 21x70 𝑚2. The facility has 43 casks of which 3 have been used to 
store reactor vessels internals from the decommissioned PWR reactor. Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 






Figure 4-1: The top view of ISFSI at Connecticut Yankee adapted from [104].  
 
Figure 4-2: Aerial view of the Connecticut Yankee ISFSI at Connecticut Yankee adapted from [104]   
4.2.3. Technology  
The focus on this section is only given to the casks used for spent fuel from Connecticut Yankee 
unless specified otherwise. The Connecticut Yankee ISFSI has used multipurpose casks from NAC 




Yankee and hence preceded by “CY’. The NAC multipurpose canister (MPC) system has 3 major 
components, namely [105]:  
 CY-MPC Transportable Storage Canister (TSC), which houses either 24 or 26 spent 
fuel assemblies [106]. 
 CY-MPC Vertical Concrete Cask (VCC) serves as storage for the TSC. It also provides 
structural support, radiation shielding and convection cooling of the spent fuel [106].  
  CY-MPC Transfer Cask (TRF) is used to move the loaded TSC into and out of the VCC. 
It also provides radiation shielding while the transfer of the TSC from the SFP to the 
VCC takes place [106].  
Below is a diagram adapted from [106], which shows the 3 main components of the NAC-
MPC system.  
 
Figure 4-3: Main components of the NAC multipurpose canister system adapted from [106].  
The VCC is made from reinforced concrete with a steel liner inside. The concrete and steel liner 
performs the functions of neutron and gamma radiation shielding.  In addition to the provision of 
radiation shielding, the concrete wall also provides structural strength for the protection of the TSC 




lead and NS-4-FR neutron shield making it a multiwall component. The combination of these 
materials is aimed at limiting radiation dose to less than 300 mrem/hr [106]. These casks have a 
maximum allowable burnup of 45 GWd/tHM and 60 GWd/tHM for PWR spent fuel assemblies with a 
required minimum cooling time of 5 years in the spent fuel pool [104].  
 
Figure 4-4: CY-MPC storage system adapted from [105] 
The casks have been placed on a concrete pad with a thickness of more than half a meter [102]. 
Some of the physical properties are shown in the tables presented below.  
 
Table 4-1: Physical parameters of the NAC multi-purpose cask system 
NAC MPC major component  Outside 
diameter (m) 
Length (m) Capacity (no. 
of fuel 
assemblies)  
Weight (tons)  
Transportable Storage 
canister 






































































dose rate  
Transfer cask  2.26 1.82 4.1 53.5 200 mrem/hr  
 
 
4.2.4. Spent nuclear fuel at Connecticut Yankee ISFSI  
The first batch of fuel to be discharged from the PWR was 23 fuel assemblies in 1971 and the last to 
be discharged was 157 fuel assemblies in 1996. The 157 fuel assemblies in the last discharge have 
been highlighted as the typical total number of fuel assemblies in a PWR. These reactor vessel 
internal wastes is what the US NRC classifies as Greater-Than-Class C Low-Level radioactive waste 
(GTCC). GTCC waste from nuclear power stations include activated metal hardware such as control 
rods, spent fuel disassembly hardware and filters [109]. The burnup of the fuel assemblies ranges 
from 38 GWd/tHM to 40GWd/tHM (Gigawatt-days per metric ton of uranium). The spent fuel initial 
enrichment was 4.03 % [105].  
4.3. Dry Storage facility at Paks in Hungary 
4.3.1. General overview of the facility  
The dry storage facility was established to provide interim storage for the spent nuclear fuel from 
the only nuclear power plant in Hungary located at the MVM Paks site. The power plant has four 
VVER-440 type reactors [67]. Reactor units 1, 2, 3 and 4 were commissioned in 1982, 1984, 1986 and 
1987, respectively, with an initial operating license of 30 years [110]. Each nuclear reactor initially 
generated 440 MW of electricity, making the total electrical output of the plant to be 1760MW. The 
plant has had advancements and adjustments on some of the major equipment, improving the 
generation output to 500 MW of electricity per reactor (per generator on each reactor).  The 
electricity output of the plant contributes about 50% of the total current electricity generation in 
Hungary [110] [111] . The operating license has been extended by 20 years for reactor units 1 and 2, 
thereby giving a new decommissioning date of 2032 and 2034 for each reactor respectively. Reactor 
units 3 and 4 are also in the process of lifespan extension by 20 years [110].  
The initial spent fuel management involved transporting the spent fuel to the then Soviet Union. The 




to the then Soviet Union.  The dry storage facility was built in stages with the first phase completed 
in 1997 and the last one out of the five completed in 2012. The first four phases which were 
completed between 1997 and 2007 consist of 16 vault modules, each with a capacity to store 450 
fuel assemblies. The last phase of the facility, completed in 2012 has 4 modules, each with a capacity 
to store 527 fuel assemblies [67] [110]. The current storage capacity is 9308 fuel assemblies. 
Provision was made to make it possible to add up to 33 vault modules which will give a total capacity 
of 16159 spent fuel assemblies (assuming vaults 21 to 33 also store 527 SFAs) [99]. Figure 4-5 below, 
adapted from [110] shows the layout, vault modules and years in which they were completed. The 
planned lifespan of the facility is 50 years [67] [112].  
 
Figure 4-5: Current layout of Paks dry storage facility [110] 
4.3.2. Location and physical dimensions  
The facility is located adjacent to the nuclear power plant at Paks, which is approximately 127 km 
south of Budapest, the capital city of Hungary.  Below is a map in Figure 4-6 showing the location of 





Figure 4-6: Location of Paks nuclear power plant and the dry storage facility, adapted from [113] 
 
Figure 4-7: Paks dry storage facility adapted from [111].  
4.3.3. Technology  
The Paks dry storage facility uses the modular vault dry storage (MVDS) technology [99]. Three main 
areas make up the complete dry storage facility, namely transfer cask reception building (TCRB), the 
charge hall and the storage modules (vaults). The TCRB serves as a fuel reception and dispatch area. 
The charge hall is an area where transportation from the TCRB to the vaults takes places using a fuel 
handling machine. The spent fuel is then stored in the vaults [99]. Below is a diagram in Figure 4-8, 





Figure 4-8: Different components of the MVDS at Paks adapted from [99] 
In the TCRB, the unloading of the fuel and fuel drying activities takes place in a protected area from 
the personnel. The area is closed off with a steel roller shutter door [99]. Fuel drying refers to the 
removal of moisture from the spent fuel assemblies prior to storage in the vaults (in this case) or 
casks [114]. The fuel handling machine is housed in the charge hall which protects it from weather-
driven deterioration. The roof of the charge hall is made from steel. The spent fuel is placed in a 
vertical sealed fuel tube which is retained in a concrete vault.  Each fuel tube holds one spent fuel 
assembly. It is made from carbon steel [99]. The first 16 vault module stores a total of 450 fuel 
assemblies each, i.e. 450 fuel tubes and the last 4 stores 527. The removal of decay heat from the 
vault type of system is achieved by circulating air through the tubes as illustrated in the figure below, 





Figure 4-9: Schematic overview of the vault dry storage cooling at Paks [115] 
 




The SFAs are transported from the SFPs using the C30 casks. The cask was licensed with the 
characteristics shown in Table 4-4 below. The tubes in the vaults are filled with nitrogen 
after placing the SFAs. The nitrogen provides a corrosion-free environment inside the vaults.  
Table 4-4: Characteristic of the C30 cask at Paks [105] 
Maximum number of fuel assemblies 30 
Total heat production  < 15kW 
Average burnup of the cask load  < 30 GWd/tHM 
Initial enrichment  < 3.7 % 
Cooling time Minimum of 3 years  
 
4.3.4. Spent nuclear fuel at Paks nuclear plant 
 
Some of the major physical characteristics of the spent fuel at Paks nuclear power plant are 
presented in Table 4-5 below. This information is adapted from the IAEA’s report on operating 
experience with nuclear power plants in member states [116].  
Table 4-5: Some of the major physical characteristics of spent fuel at Paks nuclear power plant 
adapted from [116]. 
Reactor 
unit 

















% of FAs 
replaced 
Paks 1 349 (37) 12 37  500 UO2 3.6 30 
Paks 2 349 (37) 12 37  500 UO2 3.82 
Paks 3 349 (37) 12 37  500 UO2 3.82 
Paks 4 349 (37) 12 37  500 U02 3.82 
 
4.4. Doel dry storage facility in Belgium  
4.4.1. General overview of the facility  
The interim dry storage facility presented here is at Doel nuclear power plant in Belgium. Doel 
nuclear power station is one of the two nuclear power plants in Belgium and has an output of 2919 
MW of electricity from the four nuclear reactors [117]. Reactor units 1 and 2 each have an output of 
433 MWe. Unit 3 has an output of 1006 MWe and unit 4 generates 1047 MWe. The first two units (1 
and 2) were commissioned in 1974 and 1975 respectively. The last two (3 and 4) were commissioned 
in 1982 and 1985, respectively [117]. Unit 1 and 2 were initially licensed for 40 years of operation. 
Their lifespan was extended by 10 years each thereby giving them a new decommissioning date of 
2025. Reactor units 3 and 4 were also licensed for 40 years each. It is also worth noting that units 1 
and 2 were based on the USA’s Westinghouse design, while units 3 and 4 were based on the 
French’s Framatome [117].  
The interim dry storage facility was established to provide interim storage of spent nuclear fuel from 




casks and was extended in 1998 to accommodate 165 casks capacity [118]. The initial spent fuel 
management involved reprocessing the spent fuel at France’s reprocessing facility, La Hague. It was 
only in 1993 when the reprocessing arrangement ceased was the dry storage option pursued [119]. 
The facility was designed for a lifespan of 50 years [118]. 
4.4.2. Location and physical dimensions  
 
Figure 4-11: Map of Belgium showing the location of Doel nuclear power plant [73] 
The storage facility is located on the nuclear power plant site at Doel. Shown above is a map adapted 
from [73], showing Doel nuclear power plant where the dry storage facility is located. The power 
plant and the dry storage facility are approximately 80 km north of Belgium’s capital, Brussels. It is 3 
km from the border of Belgium and Netherlands.  
4.4.3. Technology  
The dry storage facility utilizes dual-purpose metal casks from Areva Cogema Logistics, formerly 
known as Transnucleaire. The spent fuel from reactor units 1 and 2 uses TN-24 SH casks [120]. The 
spent fuel from reactor units 3 and 4 use casks TN-24 D and TN-24 XL, respectively [121]. The use of 
different casks is a result of different fuel designs for the reactors at Doel power plant.  These casks 





Figure 4-12: Cask storage building at Doel dry storage facility [122]   
The physical parameters of the cask used at Doel are shown in the table below. These were compiled 
from [120] and [122].  
Table 4-6: Some of the characteristics of the casks used at Doel dry storage facility 
Reactor 
Unit  






















Doel  1 
& 2  
TN24SH 37 29.9 4.25 5 55  
200  
 Doel 3  TN24DH 28 19.74 4.1 7 55 
Doel 4  TN24XLH  24 33 4.3 7 55 
 
The casks from the TN family are made from forged carbon steel. The closure system comprises of 2 
forged steel lids with two metallic O-ring gaskets. The fuel basket which holds the SFAs is made from 
borated stainless steel plates which provide sub-criticality in the cask. Gamma shielding is achieved 
using carbon steel. The neutron shielding function is performed by a solid resin compound between 
the inner and outer shell. Figure 4-13 below shows the typical layout of the TN 24 cask. Corrosion in 
the TN casks is prevented by thermally spraying zinc-aluminium coating in the cask cavity surfaces 
and the outer carbon steel. An additional titanium-aluminium oxide coating is applied in the cask 
cavity surface to enhance thermal emissivity. The cask is pressurized with helium at the end of the 





Figure 4-13: TN24 cask [124] 
4.4.4. Spent nuclear fuel at Doel dry storage facility  
The spent fuel from all the four reactors at Doel nuclear power plant has three types of fuel 
assembly design. Reactor units 1 and 2 share the same fuel assembly design while units 3 and 4 have 
different fuel assemblies design. Table 4-7 below gives the physical properties of the fuel assemblies 
design for the fuel at Doel.  
Table 4-7: Fuel assemblies design for the reactors at Doel [121] 
Reactor unit  Fuel assembly length (m) Arrangement  
Doel 1 and 2 2.90 4 x 14 
Doel 3 4.03 17 x 17 





Table 4-8: Some of the characteristics of the spent fuel from Doel nuclear power plant 
Reactor 
Unit 











Doel 1 121 (21) 12 45  433 𝑈𝑂2 
Doel 2 121 (21)  12 45  433 𝑈𝑂2 
Doel 3 157 (32) 12 49 1006 𝑈𝑂2/MOX 
Doel 4  157 (32) 12 45  1038 𝑈𝑂2 
 
4.5. Brief comparison of the dry storage facilities  
 
A summary of some of the key physics and engineering of the three dry storage facilities presented 
above is given in Table 4-9 below. The first noticeable aspect is that the Paks dry storage has large 
spent fuel assemblies’ capacity requirement even though its total electricity output is almost half 
that of Doel. This is due to the reactor type, VVER, which has more than double the number of SFAs 
of that of Doel. The reactor type which determines the spent fuel assemblies’ design will, in turn, 
determine the size of the facility.  Paks dry storage has the lowest dose rate of the three storage 
facilities. The dose rate is what was measured on site  









Reactor type PWR  VVER  PWR  
Dry storage type Concrete cask  Vault Metal cask 
Cask/SFAs Orientation  Vertical  Vertical  Vertical  
Dry storage capacity  1019 SFAs 9308 SFAs 4400 SFAs 
40 casks  16 vaults  165 casks  
Cooling mechanism  Natural convection  Buoyancy-driven 
ambient air flow  
Natural convection  
Dose rate limit at the 
cask surface  
170 mrem/hr  
 
26 mrem/hr  200 mrem/hr  
 
Radiation shielding  Concrete  Concrete, carbon steel   Carbon steel and 
neutron absorbing 
resin compound 
Sub-criticality  Fuel geometry  Fuel geometry  Geometrical 
arrangement of fuel 
basket. Hydrogen and 
borated plates.  
Transport from SFP to 
the dry storage facility  








5. Analysis of South Africa’s nuclear waste 
management   
Chapter 4 presented an overview of some of the interim dry storage facilities around the world that 
are currently in operation. This chapter focuses on analysing the proposed interim dry storage 
facility at South Africa’s only nuclear power plant, Koeberg. The analysis is at a high level because 
the facility has not been designed yet. There are, therefore, a number of assumptions made to make 
the analysis complete. The assumptions are stated in the relevant sections of the chapter. The 
analysis only focuses on some of the physics and engineering aspects of the interim dry storage. The 
chapter starts by giving a brief overview of the current high-level waste management.  
5.1. Koeberg’s current high-level waste management 
The two pressurized water reactors at South Africa’s only nuclear power station are of the French 
design from generation II, model CP-1. The first reactor was commissioned in 1984 and the second 
one in 1985. The table below shows some of the physical characteristics of reactors.  
Table 5-1: Some of the physical parameters of pressurized water reactors at Koeberg  
Electrical power output  930MW 
Initial licensed lifespan (extended)  40 years (60 years) 
Fuel Uranium dioxide (𝑈𝑂2) 
Enrichment  3.9%  
Pellet dimensions  15 mm long, 8mm diameter  
Zircaloy tube dimensions  4m long 
Active fuel length  3.66 m  
Fuel rod (245 pellets inside a zircaloy tube)  4m long, 9.5mm in diameter  
Fuel assembly 17 x 17 square lattice =264 fuel elements and 25 for 
control rods and other   
Fuel assembly cross section  21 x 21 𝑐𝑚2 
No. of Fuel assemblies  157 
No. of fuel elements in the core  157 x 264 = 41448 
Mass approximation of uranium  70 tonnes  
 
At present, South Africa has a nuclear waste disposal facility site for low and intermediate nuclear 
waste. Vaalputs, situated in the Northern Cape, was built in 1983 and covers about 10 000 hectares 
of land [125]. The facility is managed by the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation Limited 
(NECSA). The low and intermediate-level wastes from Koeberg are sealed, marked and stored on-site 
and transported to Vaalputs using trucks. On average, it is reported that 458 steel drums and 158 
concrete drums are shipped to the Vaalputs repository site every year. The intermediate waste is 
mixed with concrete before it can be sealed into marked concrete drums. This is done to prevent 
radioactive material from escaping during accidents scenarios.   
Koeberg currently stores its high-level waste on-site in the spent fuel pool. Although the volume of 
high-level waste is small by industry standards, it poses health risks if not handled properly. The 
initial design and plan was that the spent fuel pools would store the spent fuel for a maximum of 5 
years (about 382 fuel assemblies) and thereafter be sent for reprocessing. Reprocessing has not 




There is also a space for 157 fuel assemblies reserved for emergency core off-loading which makes 
the SFP only to have 1350 spaces [127]. The following table shows some of the physical dimensions 
of the design of the pools:  
Table 5-2: Physical dimensions of the SFP at Koeberg [128] 
Length  12.6 m  
Width  8.5 m  
Depth  12.4 m  
 
An average of 56 fuel assemblies is transferred to the SFP every 18 months. The exact number of fuel 
assemblies to be replaced in the core is 52 in theory (i.e. a third of 157 fuel assemblies) as per the 
design and calculated operation. However, during an outage, damaged fuel assemblies that may 
exist in the core are also replaced. The number of fuel assemblies to be removed also differs with 
load factor, some fuel assemblies’ energy might have been extracted at a higher burnup rate than 
anticipated and therefore require replacement sooner than planned.   Koeberg has accumulated 
2173 fuel assemblies (spent fuel) since its operation in 1984 [129] up to 2016. These were generated 
by the two PWR units in their 32 years of operation, with eight years of operation remaining from 
the initial 40 year licence period. Of the 2173 fuel assemblies generated, 112 have been transferred 
to four Castor X/28F casks which are currently housed in the Cask Storage building on site. The spent 
fuel pool at Koeberg power station for reactor 1 was filled in March 2018, and that for reactor 2 was 
filled in September 2018 [130] [68] [69]. It is also worth noting that the spent fuel that has been 
transferred to the casks were ‘old’ and had low enrichment of less than 3% and burnup of less than 
30GWd/tHM.  
With the decision to delay the final disposal strategy, a re-racking route was adopted in 1996. Re-
racking is making use of high-density racks to store more spent fuel in the SFPs. Re-racking at 
Koeberg has called for separate regions in the spent fuel pools, region 1 and 2. Region 1 has about 
210 rack positions and stores the highly reactive spent fuel which has spent the least amount of time 
in the reactor. The fuel assemblies are placed further apart to avoid criticality accidents.  Region 2 
stores less reactive fuel and has more rack positions. The assemblies are closer to each other 
compared to region 1. Both racks in these regions are constructed using stainless steel with plates of 
borated steel attached to the outside surface. The borated stainless steel used at Koeberg consists of 
1.7% boron [36].  There are currently plans to remove spent fuel from the SFPs to casks that will be 
initially stored in the cask storage building and later be moved to a planned interim storage facility 
on site. This process was expected to happen between 2017 and 2025. At the time of this 
dissertation, the process had been delayed and was expected to begin between the end of 2019 and 
the beginning of 2020.  
5.2. South Africa’s proposed dry storage facility  
South Africa’s proposed spent fuel management for high-level waste will be rolled out in 3 phases 
[129]. Phase 1 is the procurement of fourteen HI-STAR 100 metal casks from Holtec International 
and transfer of older spent fuel from the spent fuel pools to these casks. The casks will be stored in 
the cask storage building located at Koeberg power station. This phase will also require 
modifications in the cask storage building to accommodate more casks [129] [131]. In addition to the 




inserts as an interim arrangement [131] [129]. This is expected to make more space in the SFPs.  
Phase 2 will involve procurement of additional 30-40 metal or concrete casks and the transfer of 
more spent fuel from the SFPs to these casks. These additional casks will still be stored in the cask 
storage building.  Phase 3 will see an establishment of a transient interim storage facility on site. This 
will be installed on the existing power station site [129] [132]. The casks at Koeberg will be multi-
purpose because they must do both transportation and storage functions. The transportation will be 
from the cask storage building to the interim dry storage.  
Below is an aerial overview of Koeberg power station showing the proposed sites for the interim dry 
storage facility. These two sites were chosen as viable sites within the power station after applying 
various criteria from six sites that were initially identified. The proposed facility will be a 12800 𝑚2 in 
size and accommodate about 160 casks [133].  
 
Figure 5-1: Proposed sites for the interim dry storage facility at Koeberg power station [129] 
The interim dry storage facility (TISF) is expected to provide the storage until a realisation of a 
centralised Interim Storage Facility (CISF) which will store all radioactive waste in the country [134] 
[133]. South Africa has not committed to any final spent fuel strategy yet.  
5.2.1. Spent fuel quantity at Koeberg  
The quantity of the spent fuel generated by Koeberg from 1984 to the end of its 60-year extended 
lifespan is calculated as follows:   




A third is replaced every 18 months ~ 53 
Number of fuel cycles in a 60-year period=40 
Number of SFAs generated in 60 years=40 X 53=2120 SFAs per reactor  
Total number of SFAs from the two reactors after 60 years of operation=4240 SFAs 
However, provision must be made for cases where more SFAs are replaced due to damage. The 
proposed dry storage facility at Koeberg will have a capacity of 3840 SFAs (160 casks x 24 SFAs 
capacity/per cask).  If the centralised dry storage facility has not been realized at the end of the 60 
years of Koeberg reactors’ lifespan or no final disposal strategy decided upon, the SFPs can be 
expected to continue to store at least 400 SFAs. The pros and cons of designing interim dry storage 
that will store all the SFAs generated in the 60 years will need to be then studied. The design 
capacity decision will also be based on possible future decisions that the country can take with 
regard to final disposal option and other related nuclear power decisions. For example, these two 
scenarios briefly outlined below can influence the design capacity differently: 
(i). South Africa builds no more nuclear power plants  
If South Africa decides not to build any more nuclear power plants, the dry storage facility will only 
be required to store just over 4240 SFAs. The design can therefore, be such that the current capacity 
will easily be increased to store the remaining 400 SFAs. There may be no need to extend the facility 
if there will be a final disposal decision taken by 2055. This is because the last 400 SFAs from 
approximately eight last fuel replacement outages will only be required to be moved out of the 
spent nuclear fuel pool from 2049 assuming a 10-year cooling period in the spent fuel pool.  
(ii). South Africa builds more nuclear power plants according to IRP 2018 
According to the IRP 2018, new nuclear power plants would only come in post-2045 [135]. Assuming 
a cooling time of 10 years in the spent fuel pool, the spent fuel will only move to dry cask from 2055. 
In this year, the dry storage facility will be 30 years old provided it will have started operations in 
2025. The facility would need to be extended then if it is envisioned to accommodate the spent fuel 
from the new nuclear plants or designed with the capacity to allow for ease of expansion. The other 
alternative would be to build the dry storage facility in the other proposed sites within Koeberg 
power station or new sites in the new nuclear power stations.  
The continued decline in electricity demand coupled with high pressure to increase renewable 
energy contribution are diminishing the prospects of nuclear power growth in South Africa, at least 
by introducing a delay in new build or even a possibility for nuclear power to be not part of the 
future energy mix. On the other hand, the expected decommissioning of the Eskom’s old coal plants 
in the period between 2023 and 2050 necessitates baseload supply increase. These factors introduce 
a number of uncertainties at the moment. In this minor dissertation, the opinion is that the dry 
storage capacity should be guided by scenario 1. This will be taking advantage of the modularity 
aspect of dry cask storage while also allowing for nuclear waste technology to evolve for possible 




5.3. The HI-STAR 100 Cask  
 
5.3.1. General information  
The HI-STAR 100 is a multi-purpose cask designed by Holtec International for storage, transport and 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel. It is the proposed cask to be used at Koeberg [129]. The HI-STAR 100 
name is an acronym from Holtec International Storage, Transport and Repository Cast System [136].  
It consists of a multi-purpose canister (MPC) which houses the fuel and an overpack which houses 
the MPC. The cask also has impact limiters at the top and bottom of the overpack that are attached 
during transportation. These are used to absorb kinetic energy during normal and accident drop 
conditions [93]. The diagram of the HI-STAR 100 cask system (MPC with the overpack), adapted from 
[137] with the MPC partially inserted is shown in Figure 5-2. This diagram is for visual presentation. 
The MPC has a variety of designs that can accommodate different fuel designs.  
 




The cask for 24 PWR SFAs weighs about 37418 kg when fully loaded with spent nuclear fuel. The 
overpack weighs about 110 545kg, therefore, a fully loaded cask with 24 PWR fuel assembly will 
weigh a total of 147963 kg.  
The impact limiters, attached at the bottom and top of the overpack are also shown in Figure 5-3 
below, also adapted from [137]. These are made of corrugated sheets of aluminium alloy. Some of 
the characteristics of the HI-STAR 100 cask system for PWR SFAs are shown in Table 5-3 below. The 
cask system was licenced by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1995 and was one of the first 
casks to be licensed in the world. The granting of the licence was preceded by a variety of tests 
ranging from free drop test, corner drop and many more. The system has been designed with a 




Figure 5-3: The impact limiters on the HI-STAR 100 cask system [137]  
The MPC is made of austenitic stainless steel alloy, and the overpack is made of ferritic steel. 
Austenitic stainless steel is a group of stainless steel containing between 16 and 26% chromium and 




an essential requirement for casks, especially if they will be in an outdoor environment and close to 
the sea. Typical ferritic steel contains between 10 and 27% of chromium and does not have nickel 
[138] [97].  
Table 5-3: Some of the characteristics of HI-STAR 100 cask proposed to be used at Koeberg 
























24 4.6% (17 
X17 fuel 
assembly) 
44 20kW  36287 
 
5.3.2. Spent fuel storage capacity of the HI-STAR 100 cask 
The HI-STAR 100 cask that has been proposed to be used at Koeberg’s dry storage facility stores 24 
PWR spent fuel assemblies with spent fuel characteristics as shown in Table 5-3 above. The 
maximum number of SFAs to be stored in a 160-cask facility will be 3840.  
5.3.3. Sub-criticality of the HI-STAR 100 cask  
The sub-criticality of the spent fuel in the HI-STAR 100 cask is achieved using four factors: 
 the geometry of the fuel basket designs  
 neutron absorbing material in the fuel basket  
 limit on the maximum fuel enrichment (4.6% as shown in Table 5-3)  
 limit on the minimum soluble boron concentration in the water during loading of the fuel.  
The first two factors are incorporated into the design of the cask. The maximum calculated effective 
neutron multiplication factor, 𝑘𝑒𝑓𝑓, for a HI-STAR 100 cask are given in below. This is a cask with the 
MPC loading 24 fuel assemblies. Using the neutron multiplication factor, 𝑘𝑒𝑓𝑓, the corresponding 











boron during fuel 
loading  










value , 𝜌 
17 x 17 No boron 4% 0.9368 -0.0675 





Koeberg’s fuel enrichment of 3.9% is below the values in Table 5-4, and if soluble boron of minimum 
amount of 400 ppm is in the spent fuel pool, the neutron multiplication will be substantially lower 
than 0.95 thereby ensuring sub-criticality of the spent fuel in the casks.  Other MPC designs for the 
HI-STAR 100 such as MPC-24 allow for storage of damaged fuel as well. The geometrical 
arrangement shown in Figure 5-4 below is maximized for sub-criticality. The term boral in Figure 5-4 
indicates composite material made from boron carbide and aluminium alloy [93].   
 
Figure 5-4: Top view of the MPC-24 for the HI-STAR 100 cask [93] 
 The fuel baskets contain boron-10 which has a neutron capture cross-section of 3840 barns for 
thermal neutrons. The outer dimension of the MPC shown in Figure 5-4 is 1.7367 m.  
 
5.3.4. Radiation containment in the HI-STAR 100 cask 
 
Radiation shielding in the HI-STAR 100 cask begins at the MPC and goes all the way to the overpack. 
The steel and borated plates in the MPC attenuate gamma and neutron radiation. The overpack is 
made of carbon steel which attenuates gamma radiation. The inner and outer diameters of the 
overpack are 1.74625 m and 2.4384 m respectively. This gives the overpack a thickness of about 
0.69215 m. It consists of the inner, first intermediate and intermediate shells as shown in Figure 5-5 
below. These are assembled in plate stock forms. One of the carbon steel types used in the HI-STAR 
100 overpack is SA516 Grade 70, which consists of the elements in Table 5-5 shown below. The cask 
design assumes an internal gamma radiation exposure of the order of 1010 rads (1 rad equals 0.01 
gray) from the spent nuclear fuel. Damage of the material in the cask due to neutron radiation 
































[%𝒘 × 𝝁𝒊] 
(𝒄𝒎−𝟏) 
Carbon (C) 0.22 3.047 × 10−2 1.7 0.052 0.0114 
Silicon (Si) 0.6 3.24 × 10−2 2.33 0.076 0.046 
Manganese 
(Mn) 
1.17 3.213 × 10−2 7.47 0.240 0.281 
Phosphorus (P) 0.03 3.172 × 10−2 1.823 0.058 0.002 
Sulfur (S) 0.03 2.293 × 10−2 2.0 0.045 0.001 
Nickel (Ni)  0.3 3.444 × 10−2 8.908 0.307 0.092 
Chromium (Cr)  0.3 3.325 × 10−2 7.19 0.239 0.072 
Molybdenum 
(Mo) 
0.08 3.496 × 10−2 10.28 0.359 0.029 
Aluminum (Al) 0.02 3.106 × 10−2 2.7 0.084 0.002 
Copper (Cu) 0.3 3.318 × 10−2 8.96 0.297 0.089 
Vanadium (V) 0.02 3.141 × 10−2 6.11 0.192 0.004 






The overpack also consists of a neutron-absorbing material called Holtite-A. It is defined as “a 
poured-in-place solid borated synthetic neutron-absorbing polymer” [93]. The properties of Holtite-
A material are given in appendix D.  
 
The calculated dose rates on the exterior surface of the HI-STAR 100 casks are lower than the limit 
specified by the NNR. The highest dose rate is at the bottom of the cask, which is the gamma 
radiation of 115.63 mrem/hr. The second-highest dose rate is at the side of the cask which is the 
neutron radiation at 78.65 mrem/hr. Other gamma and neutron radiation dose rates at different 
positions of the cask are given in Table 5-7 below, along with the limits specified by the United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and South Africa’s National Nuclear Regulator. The gamma 
energies approximated for this is between 3 and 4 MeV [136].  The NNR limit of 20 mSv a year can 
only be exceeded with the following scenario: if a worker were to stand by the surface of the cask 
for a minimum of 2.54 × 107 hours in a year. This is not possible as a year has 8760 hours.  This has 
been calculated as follows using values in Table 5-6: 
 




1 𝑟𝑒𝑚 = 0.01 𝑆𝑣, ∴ 1 𝑚𝑟𝑒𝑚 =  1 × 10−5 𝑆𝑣 
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 78.65 𝑚𝑟𝑒𝑚 = 7.865 × 10−4𝑆𝑣 = 7.865 × 10−7𝑚𝑆𝑣 
 
𝑇𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 20𝑚𝑆𝑣: 
20 𝑚𝑆𝑣/ℎ𝑟
7.865×10−7 𝑚𝑆𝑣
 = 2.54 × 107 hours 
 
 
 This scenario is very conservative because it assumes that the distance between the worker and the 
overpack surface is zero, i.e. the worker is in contact with the surface of the overpack.  It also 
assumes that the worker is not wearing any protective clothing. Even if the radiation at the cask 
surface is the maximum 200 mrem as specified by the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the hours 
required for a worker to reach 20 mSv would be 10 000.  
 
Table 5-6: Calculated maximum external dose rates for the HI-STAR 100 cask with 24 PWR fuel 
baskets [93] 
Radiation type (mrem/hr) Top of the cask Side of the cask Bottom of the cask 
Gamma  0.52 1.35 115.63 
Neutron  3.63 78.65 11.38 
Total 4.15 80 127.01 
US NRC limit (mrem/hr) 200 200 200 
NNR limit to workers 
(mSv/year) 
20 20 20 
 
5.3.5. Decay heat removal in the HI-STAR 100 cask 
Decay heat in the HI-STAR 100 cask is passively transferred from the fuel in the MPC to the 
environment, as shown in Figure 5-6 below.  The MPC basket design also incorporates the 
elimination of the structural discontinuities in the MPC in order to reduce thermal heat resistance to 








Table 5-7: Thermal heat conductivity of different materials used for the MPC and the overpack 
Material in the MPC Thermal conductivity (W/m.K) 
At 366 K (93.33 ° C) At 644 K (371.11° C) 
Helium 0.098 0.158 
Aluminum  84.4 97.4 
Air 0.017 0.027 
Material in the overpack   
Carbon steel 24.4 22.4 
Cryogenic steel 23.8 22.3 
Holtite-A 1 1 
 
 
Figure 5-6: Decay heat removal in the HI-STAR 100 cask 
The calculation of decay heat removal is complex and done using computer programs as discussed in 
3.4. The following is a simplified calculation to demonstrate the decay heat removal phenomenon. 
The calculation is an approximation of the net radial heat transfer from the SFA interior using the 
Wooten-Epstein equation that was presented in section 3.4 of this dissertation. The following 




Table 5-8: Values used to calculate Wooten-Epstein heat transfer 
Parameter  Value  Source  
𝜀𝐶  0.80 From [93] 
𝜀𝐵 0.36 From [93] 
N 17 From 17 x 17 SFA as indicated in Table 5-1 
SFA width 0.21 m  From Table 5-1 
L 3.66 m From Table 5-1 
𝐾𝐶𝑆 0.4791 From [93] 
𝑇𝐶  773.15 K From [93] 
𝑇𝐵 695.15 K From [93] 
 

























 = 0.3303 
𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐴 = 4 × 𝑆𝐹𝐴 𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ × 𝑆𝐹𝐴 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ = 4 × 3.66 × 0.21 =3.0744 𝑚
2 
∴ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑠:   
=  𝜎 ×  𝐶0  × 𝐹𝜀 × 𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐴  × (𝑇𝐶
4 − 𝑇𝐵
4) 





= 1496.226 W 
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑏𝑦: 
= 13.5740 × 𝐿 × 𝐾𝐶𝑆(𝑇𝐶 − 𝑇𝐵) 
= 13.5740 × 3.66 × 0.4791 × (773.15 − 695.15) 
= 1856.563 W 
∴ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟 =  𝑄𝑊𝐸 = 3352.789 𝑊/hr 
In this scenario, heat transfer is dominated by the second term, which represents the conduction 
heat transfer mechanism. The other assumption made here is that heat generation is uniform in the 
spent fuel assembly.  
5.3.6. Response of the HI-STAR 100 cask to seismic events 
The maximum horizontal acceleration of the HI-STAR 100 is 0.473g [96]. The peak ground 
acceleration (PGA) calculated at Koeberg power station site was 0.3g [139].  The cask can be 





5.3.7. Corrosion of the HI-STAR 100 cask   
The austenitic stainless steel in the HI-STAR 100 overpack is mostly prone to stress corrosion 
cracking (SCC). In environments close to the seas such as the proposed sites for the dry storage 
facility at Koeberg, the environment supports the phenomenon of SCC, i.e. there is a presence of 
chloride salts. The helium in the MPC provides a non-aqueous and inert environment that slows 
down the corrosion phenomenon in the MPC. The steel surface of the overpack is coated with 
carboline while the inner cavity is coated with thermaline 450 [93]. The physical properties of these 
are given in Appendix E.  
 
5.3.8. Transportation of the HI-STAR 100 cask  
The HI-STAR 100 casks can be transported using heavy haul trailers by road or rail. The casks are 
transported in a vertical orientation with impact limiters as elucidated above to absorb the kinetic 
energy in case of an accident, thereby preventing damage to the casks. The proposed dry storage 
facility and haul route at Koeberg will be within the existing nuclear power plant’s footprint, as 
shown in Figure 5-1 above. This should minimise risks during transportation of the casks as there will 
be no public interference. Sea transportation can also be used for spent nuclear fuel from the 
proposed Koeberg dry storage facility to a centralised storage facility in South Africa if it will be along 
the coast or in other countries outside Africa. An evaluation of a possible route from the proposed 
dry storage facility to inland parts of the country which has the potential to host a centralised 

















The role of nuclear power and some of its challenges have been presented briefly in this minor 
dissertation report. While the contribution of nuclear power continues to grow in some countries, 
others have decided to reduce its contribution to electricity generation. This is due to a number of 
issues, including spent nuclear fuel management. The spent fuel pool technology can be qualified as 
one of the spent fuel management strategies that have matured over the years and is providing 
interim storage for all countries with nuclear power reactors. However, this interim storage has 
capacity challenges and needs active cooling. The introduction of dry storage facilities does not 
replace the need for spent fuel pools but rather makes them return to their intended shorter-term 
interim storage function while the spent fuel decay heat decreases to an acceptable level. This short 
term is typically between 3 to 10 years. It is also noted that both spent fuel pool and dry cask storage 
are interim storage technologies.  
Although dry storage facilities are also regarded as an interim storage option, they aid in spent fuel 
management and in particular addressing the space and active cooling requirement challenges of 
the SFPs. However, if the capacity and active cooling challenges of the spent fuel pools are resolved, 
the need for dry storage will be eliminated. South Africa’s proposed interim dry storage facility for 
spent nuclear fuel, expected to be installed by 2025 was presented briefly in this minor dissertation. 
Some of the major physics and engineering aspects were discussed. The physics aspects discussed 
here include radiation containment, spent fuel quantity and characteristics and sub-criticality. The 
engineering aspects discussed are decay heat removal, site location factors, corrosion of the casks, 
transportation infrastructures, operability and monitoring.  
While the proposed interim dry storage facility will accommodate most of the SFAs from Koeberg’s 
reactors, there will be about 9% of the casks that will not be accommodated at the end of a 60-year 
reactor life. However, should the power plant not operate up to the intended 60-year period, the 
facility can accommodate all the SFAs up to 54 years of operation. If it is desired to have all the SFAs 
accommodated at the facility, casks which store more SFAs can be procured later. The dry storage 
facility can then be extended. One of the significant advantages of dry storage facilities is that they 
provide modularity just like Paks dry storage facility as presented in this minor dissertation. This 
feature of dry storage technology should be considered for South Africa in order to address this 
aspect.   
The chosen HI-STAR 100 casks have satisfactory and conservative radiation containment and sub-
criticality measures. The spent fuel at Koeberg power plant would have spent more than the 
required minimum cooling time of 5 years in the spent fuel pool before loading them into the casks. 
Most of the spent fuel would have spent at least 20 years in the SFP. In addition to many more years 
of cooling in the spent fuel pool, the burnup at Koeberg is significantly lower than that of the 
calculated 40 GWd/tHM, i.e. Koeberg’s average burnup is 33 GWd/tHM. The fuel enrichment is also 
below the maximum of 4% of the HI-STAR 100 cask.  The decay heat removal capability of the HI-
STAR 100 cask is satisfactory for the spent fuel at Koeberg. This is also supported by the longer 
cooling time the spent fuel would have had in the SFPs as highlighted above.  
The proposed facility at Koeberg will be in the existing power station footprint, which is also the case 
for all other facilities presented here. This will allow for ease of transportation of the cask from the 




and security installations as the site already has some security. South Africa’s land area is more than 
30 times bigger than of Belgium. The airports in South Africa are also less busy than Belgium’s. These 
factors together with the geographical location of South Africa in contrast to Belgium’s, makes air 
traffic congestion the least of South Africa’s worries, thereby reducing the probability of plane crash 
incidents on the proposed facility. There is, therefore, no need for South Africa’s proposed dry cask 
storage facility to be housed in a concrete building like that at Doel.  
While the proposed dry storage facility may not present an apparent technical problem, other non-
technical aspects should be considered when deciding on the facility. One of the key aspects is the 
timeline of the facility based on the proposed delay in new nuclear reactors and decreased energy 
demand in contrast to the original IRP 2010. A delay in building the facility sounds reasonable on the 
basis that there would be less electricity generated from the country. However, Koeberg is a 
baseload power station and is likely to remain like that for a long time due to its lowest operation 
cost compared to other power stations [140]. This implies that even though the electricity demand 
has decreased with the possibility of continuing to decrease, Koeberg will continue to generate 
spent fuel waste continuously. 
 A delay in the facility construction will imply that phase 1A of the proposed spent fuel management 
which involves procurement of 7 metal casks to be stored in the modified cask building. Assuming 
the same casks as the ones in the cask building are procured, the seven casks would store 196 fuel 
assemblies (28 FAs per cask). This would be equivalent to 6 outages, i.e. three outages per reactor, 
thereby giving three additional years from 2018 before the spent fuel pool and cask building are full. 
The decision to delay the interim storage beyond 2021 would therefore not be favourable if the 
power station is to operate up to its initial 40-year lifespan or the extended 60-year lifespan. The 
transportation of the casks from the spent fuel pool does not present any apparent challenges as it 
will be within the power station footprint with no interference from the public. The cask can also 
withstand the expected maximum ground peak acceleration at Koeberg.  
After writing this minor dissertation, it is the opinion of the writer that the proposed dry storage 
facility at Koeberg is satisfactory to provide an interim storage solution to allow for continuous 
operation of Koeberg nuclear power plant. This opinion is based on the physics and engineering 
aspects presented in this minor dissertation. The continuous operation of Koeberg nuclear power 
plant is vital for South Africa, especially at these current challenging economic times for the country. 
The power plant has the lowest operating costs, and the dry storage will avoid premature closure of 
the power plant. Future research for those wishing to add to the analysis of the suitability of this 












Appendix A: Derivation of the scattered photon’s energy in Compton scattering  
The incident photon has an incident energy 𝐸𝛾. The scattered photon will have energy 𝐸
′
𝛾. This is 
shown below.  
 
Figure 0-1: Compton scattering adapted from [42] 
Conservation of energy gives the following equation for the scattered electron: 
𝑇 =  𝐸𝛾 −  𝐸𝛾
′ = 𝐸 − 𝑚𝑐2 (A1)  
The conservation of momentum also gives the following equations for the incident photon and 








  (A2) 
The momentum of the scattered electron must, therefore, be added vectorially, as shown in Figure 
0-2 below.  
 
Figure 0-2: The vector relationship between the momentum of the incident photon, scattered 





The cosine rule is applied to give the following equation: 
 
(𝑝𝑐)2 = 𝐸𝛾
2 +  (𝐸𝛾
′)2 − 2𝐸𝛾𝐸
′
𝛾 cos 𝜃  (A3) 
Substituting for 𝑝𝛾  and 𝑝𝛾
′ in equation (A3) from equation (A2) and using the relation 𝐸2 =  𝑝2 𝑐2 +
 𝑚2 𝑐4 for the electron, (A3) becomes:  
(𝑝𝑐)2 =  𝐸2 − 𝑚2𝑐4   (A4) 
Eliminating E from (A4) and (A1), the scattered photon energy can be expressed as follows:  
𝐸𝛾








 Appendix B: Parameters of a CASTOR 440/84 metal cask adapted from [70] 
 
Table 0-1: Parameters of CASTOR 440/84 metal cask 
 
 
Maximum Heat output  21kW 
Maximum enrichment  3.65%  
Maximum burnup 42 GWd/tHM 
Typical Cooling time 60 months  
Cask length  4.080 m 
Cask diameter  2.660 m 
Wall thickness 370 mm 
Cask body material  Ductile cast iron 
Lid material  Stainless steel  




Appendix C: Detailed diagram of a CASTOR 440/84 metal cask as adapted from [70] and 
[141] 
 
The above metal cask is designed to store 24 PWR fuel assemblies. The dimensions shown on the 
right are in mm. The following table shows some of the parameters of the cask [70].  









Appendix E: Properties of carboline  
 
Carboline as used in coating of the HI-STAR 100 cask is a dense cross-linked polymer used to 
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